F 






UNITED STATES OF AMEEIOA. 



CORRESPONDENCE 



BETWEEN 



THE BRAZILIAN AND ARGENTINE 
GOVERNMENTS 



RESPECTING 



THE TREATIES CONCLUDED BETWEEN BRAZIL AND 
THE REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY AND THE 
WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM THE ISLAND OF 

ATAJO. 



LONDON: A 
PRINTED BY C. W. REYNELL, LITTLE PULTENEY STREET, 

HATMARKET. 

August, 1872. 



CORRESPONDENCE 

BETWEEN THE 

ARGENTINE & BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENTS 

EE3PECTIXG THE 

TREATY OF ALLIANCE OF 1st MAY, 1865. 



MARSHAL FRANCISCO SOLANO LOPEZ, Dictator 
of Paraguay, having got together a large army and 
a considerable naval force, seized the shipping of Brazil 
in passing Assuncion, and that of the Argentine Republic 
at Corrientes, invaded, devastated, and occupied their 
territories, exacted a change of Government in the 
Republic of Uruguay, and manifested designs of attempt- 
ing to dominate in the Plate. 

Against these common attacks and dangers the 
Empire of Brazil and the Argentine and Uruguay Repub- 
lics united, forming, at Buenos Ay res, a Treaty of Alliance, 
Offensive and Defensive, on 1st May, 1865. 

The objects of the Treaty were : the revindication of 
the territories invaded, the removal of Lopez from Para- 
guay, the maintenance of that State in full sovereignty, 
independence, and integrity under such other Government as 
Paraguay might thereafter select, the formation of relations 
of peace and friendship with its Government, compensation 
from it for the cost of the war forced on the Allies, security 
for free navigation of the rivers, and well-defined limits 
between Brazil and Paraguay and the Argentine Republic 
and Paraguay respectively. 

The brunt and chief cost of the five years' war which 
followed fell on Brazil. Hostilities terminated by the death 
of Lopez on the 1st March, 1870. 



4 



A Provisional Government having been formed in 
Paraguay, Preliminaries of Peace were concluded on the 
20th June, 1870, between the Allies and. that Government. 
By those Preliminaries it was arranged that, before the 
conclusion of Treaties of Definitive Peace and Limits with 
the permanent Government of Paraguay, the latter should 
have an opportunity of being heard on its title to disputed 
territory. 

Subsequently, in conferences between the Allies at 
Buenos Ayres, it was further provided (Bolivia having 
also advanced claims to the Chaco) that, in case of ultimate 
differences as to territory, some fitting mode of solution 
should be arrived at. 

From March, 1870, Brazil treated at Buenos Ayres 
with its Allies for a common basis for collective negociations 
with Paraguay. But Brazil encountered pretensions set 
up on the part of the Argentine Republic to the whole of 
the Chaco. 

At last, in October, 1871, the Allied Envoys met 
at Assuncion to conclude definitive treaties. Before, 
however, collective negotiations could be opened, the 
Argentine Envoy suddenly quitted Assuncion, leaving 
behind him a proposal for their indefinite adjournment. 

Thereupon the Paraguay Government invited the 
Brazilian Envoy to conclude separate Treaties, and as, 
pending their formation, the expenses of Brazil in the 
rivers were large, and the internal state of Paraguay was 
disorganised, the Brazilian Envoy accepted the invitation, 
and concluded in December, 1871, Treaties of Peace and 
Amity, of Limits, Commerce, and Extradition, with Para- 
guay. These were ratified, and the ratifications ex- 
changed. The Treaties so made were communicated to 
the Argentine and Uruguay Governments. It was pointed 
out that their contents were a simple elaboration of the 
terms of the Alliance so far as those terms affected Brazil, 
with this exception, that the delimitations arranged between 
the two States considerably fell short of those terms, 
that in no respect were the Treaties inconsistent with the 
Alliance, and that their being concluded was consistent with 
its spirit and letter. The Government of Paraguay also 
announced to that of the Argentine Republic that it was 
ready to conclude similar Treaties with it. 



5 



Instead of acting on this announcement, the Argentine 
Government, which had already taken possession of the 
Missiones, on the bank of the Parana, belonging to Para- 
guay, declared the whole of the Chaco, on the bank of 
the river Paraguay, to be Argentine territory, and occupied 
by an armed force Villa Occidental, the only town in it, 
lying nearly opposite Assuncion, the capital of Paraguay. 
Although these proceedings were at variance with the 
Preliminaries of Peace and the Protocols of Buenos Ayres, 
and in disregard of the Paraguayan and Bolivian pretensions 
to the Chaco, the Government of Brazil did not take any 
steps thereon, or join in the protest made by Paraguay. 

But, as journals at Buenos Ayres were vehemently 
declaiming against the separate Treaty concluded with 
Paraguay, and exasperating Argentine public opinion 
against Brazil, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
addressed an explanatory Circular Dispatch on the 3rd of 
February, 1872, to the Legations of the Empire, a transla- 
tion of which forms No. 1 of the following documents. 

It was not until 27th April, 1872, that the Argentine 
Government entered a protest against the Treaties. That 
was then done in a lengthy Dispatch (No. 2), to the 
Brazilian Government. But, before it was replied to, this 
Dispatch was made public at Buenos Ayres, thus feeding 
the flame of popular excitement there, and rousing, by its 
violence and injustice, counter indignation in the Brazilian 
Empire. 

To this Dispatch the Brazilian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs rejoined by the answer dated 20th June, 1872, to 
which was appended a Memorandum; these Documents con- 
stitute No. 3 of the pieces to which attention is now directed. 

In this correspondence it will be seen that the Treaty 
of Alliance bound the Allies to respect and guarantee the 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of 
Paraguay, and this Brazil has done by its separate rela- 
tions with that State, and so confirmed the Alliance. 
But Brazil had, by the separate Treaty, agreed, at the 
instance of Paraguay, to continue a small military force in 
Paraguay, for the preservation of internal order, and of 
this the Argentine Government complains, forgetful that 
it, too, still keeps forces there, and has military occupa- 
tion of Villa Occidental 



By the Treaty of Alliance the Allies bound themselves 
not to obtain any Protectorate over Paraguay. Brazil, in 
concluding its separate Treaty, refused all Protectorate. 

By the Alliance the Allies determined upon requiring 
payment of the cost of the war. By their separate Treaties 
Brazil and Paraguay agreed to assess the Brazilian cost 
within two years. Under the 10th Article of the Alliance, 
the Argentine Kepublic is entitled to make a similar 
provision for its war expenses. 

Although these are made grounds of complaint against 
Brazil in the Argentine Dispatch (No. 2), the real motive 
of complaint is that Brazil has not obliged Paraguay 
by force to cede territory, on its title to which it had 
been arranged that that State should be heard, and in 
respect of which also " the rights of Bolivia were expressly 
" reserved by the Protocol annexed to the Treaty of 1st 
" May." 

To a complete cession both of the Missiones and the 
Chaco to the Argentine Republic Brazil makes, as it will be 
seen, no objection. But, in the interests of peace in the 
Plate, in conformity with the Preliminaries of Peace, with 
the Protocols of Buenos Ayres, and by virtue of her duties 
to Paraguay and Bolivia, she declines to be a party to 
compelling such cession without due investigation of con- 
flicting rights, or without combined negotiations. 

All its Treaties of delimitations (now happily fixed) 
with neighbouring Republics have been concluded, after 
discussion and by force of right. There would consequently 
be an inconsistency in her sanctioning a rule as to the 
limits of Paraguay and the Argentine Republic differing 
from and opposed to the rule by which she arranged 
limits with Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, and Paraguay. 

But, while asking for Paraguay and Bolivia a due 
hearing as to their rights or pretensions, Brazil denies that 
by such request there is afforded ground either for 
rupturing the Alliance of 1st May, 18(35, or for the 
reproaches addressed to her by the Argentine Government 
for having led the way separately to the definitive relations 
with Paraguay which were contemplated by that Alliance. 



No. 1. 



THE BRAZILIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
TO THE BRAZILIAN LEGATIONS. 

Rio de Janeiro, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
February 3rd, 1872. 

THE NEWS that Baron de Cotegipe, Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipotentiary from Brazil to the 
Argentine Republic, the Oriental Uruguay and Paraguay, had 
negociated separately with the Paraguayan Government 
definitive terms of peace, and the Treaty of Limits, forming 
part thereof, roused, it seems, the anger of newspaper-writers 
in Buenos Ayres, who, with the exception of those belonging to 
the " Standard," burst forth, without possessing an exact know- 
ledge of the facts, into hostile expressions of opinion against 
the Empire, accusing it of having violated the alliance agreed 
upon by the Treaty of the 1st of May, 1865. 

It is contended that this Treaty does not allow that one of 
the Allies should negociate singly with the vanquished, whether 
in respect of the terms which are of common interest, or as 
regards the Special Treaty of Limits. 

It is expedient to clear up this point before entering on 
an appreciation of the facts that justify the course adopted 
by the Imperial Government, as this Government is deter- 
mined not to depart, in any degree, from the measure of its 
rights. 

As to the Treaty of Limits it is beyond all question, 
judging by the letter and spirit of the Conventions of Alliance, 
that it could not be carried into effect otherwise than 
separately. 

Article XVI. of the Treaty of the 1st of May says : 
"The Allies will require that the Government of Paraguay 
"shall conclude with the respective Governments definitive 
" Treaties of Limits." 

If such be the letter of the Treaty, no less clear is the 
spirit. 

It would, in effect, be absurd to suppose that the Treaty 
of Limits between the Argentine Republic and that of 
Paraguay should be left to depend on the ratification of the 
Brazilian Government, just as though a similar Treaty, fixing 



8 



the boundaries between Brazil and Paraguay, should be made to 
depend, in order to ensure its validity, on the approval of the 
Argentine Congress and on the ratification of the Government 
of that Republic. 

To understand the Conventions of Alliance differently, not 
only would these Treaties be left in such a dependence as 
further to necessitate the approval of the Congress and Go- 
vernment of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, but, in other 
respects, so as not to decide any question whatever of limits 
with Paraguay. 

If, as to the other definitive terms of peace contained 
in the Treaty of the 1st of May, 1865, there is not to be 
met a provision justifying so explicitly the course adopted 
by the Brazilian Plenipotentiary ; on analysing the agree- 
ment contained in Articles IV. and X. of that Treaty, the 
faculty pertaining to each of the Allies to negociate 
separately will not be the less evident. 

Article VI. solemnly establishes an understanding between 
the Allies not to lay down arms otherwise than by common 
consent, and then only upon the authority of the Government 
at that time holding power in Paraguay being set aside ; and 
further, that they should not negociate with the common 
enemy separately, nor conclude Treaties of peace, truce, or 
armistice, nor any agreement whatever to suspend or terminate 
the war, otherwise than by perfect accord with one another. 

Thus, then, Article VI. provided for negociating separately 
in the cases just supposed, namely, the laying down of 
arms, the conclusion of Treaties of peace, truce, or armistice 
with the common enemy, or a Convention, having for its 
end and purpose the suspension or the termination of war. 

From the 1st of March, 1870, the common enemy dis- 
appeared, and the preliminary settlement of peace with the 
Paraguayan Government, concluded the 20th of June the same 
year, was furthermore made in perfect accord with all the Allies. 

In order to maintain the view that the other Treaties 
and Conventions should rigorously be concluded in common, 
it would be necessary to generalise the provisions of Article VI., 
but this could not restrain the mode of action or the intention 
of any one of the Allies. 

So far is this the interpretation to be given to the Treaty, 
that, in Article X., the high contracting parties agreed " that 
" the franchises, privileges, or concessions, which they might 
" obtain from the Government of Paraguay, were to become 
" common to all voluntarily, if voluntarily rendered, or with a 
" like compensation or equivalent, in case conditions happened 
" to be attached." 

If the Treaties, with the exception of those under 
Article VI., were necessarily to be concluded in common, 



9 



no plausible explanation could be afforded of what had been 
agreed on by Article X. 

Article XVII., establishing a mutual guarantee between 
the Allies in respect of the terms to be settled with the new 
Paraguayan Government, confirms the interpretation we have 
given to the Treaty of the 1st of May. The guarantee would 
be superfluous if the terms of peace were, at all events, to be 
signed as a joint act, in which should appear as parties, on the 
one side, the Allies; and, on the other, the Paraguayan 
Government. 

To negociate terms jointly or separately was then a matter 
of convenience and of expediency. The Allies might and 
could proceed with common accord, either jointly or separately, 
while respecting with fidelity the mutual understanding come 
to between them. 

It is not the Imperial Government alone which has studied 
with attention the Treaty of the 1st of May with a deliberate 
purpose of fulfilling it exactly as the Government understands 
it. A like intention has been manifested by the Plenipotentiary 
of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay ; and, while stating this, 
I render with pleasure the homage due to the conciliatory 
character of Dr Adolfo Rodrigues, who gave himself quite as 
much trouble as the Brazilian Plenipotentiary, to the end 
that the alliance, or terms of peace, might be crowned with as 
happy success as were the feats of arms. The Imperial 
Government, desiring that the definitive Treaty of Peace with 
Paraguay should be confirmed by all the Allies, recommended 
its Plenipotentiaiy, in order to secure this, to spare no effort 
that was deemed fitting. 

The settlement of terms has been deferred for two years, 
in consequence of a difference of opinion on the part of the 
Argentine Government in regard to the expediency of con- 
cluding them at all. 

At the end of the year 1870 we made a new effort in 
order to wind up a negociation, the retarding whereof had left 
the rights of the Empire unrecognised, and the causes which 
gave rise to the war still subsisting, placing Brazil under 
the obligation of maintaining forces by land and sea in 
Paraguay, and keeping this Republic likewise under con- 
straint and unassured. 

We succeeded in coming to a preliminary Convention with 
our Allies, and secured it after negociations that lasted not 
less than two months. 

Under this preliminary Convention, concluded in Buenos 
Ayres in December, 1870, and January, 1871, by the Plenipoten- 
tiaries of the three allied nations, Senhores Visconde do Rio 
Branco, Carlos Tejedor, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argen- 
tine Republic, and Adolfo Rodrigues, it was agreed that the two 

B 



10 



questions whose solution presented the greatest difficulties, 
that, namely, of the boundary line of the Argentine Republic 
and of Paraguay from the Chaco up to Bahia Negra, and that 
relating to the prohibition contained in the Protocol annexed 
to the Treaty of the 1st of May, as to the raising of fortifica- 
tions on the Paraguayan shore, should be kept open while the 
negociations with the Government of the Republic of Paraguay 
were going on, in the hope that some acceptable solution might 
be happened on. 

The question of the boundary line was settled in accordance 
with the proposal of Senhor Tejedor, and the other in conformity 
with that put forward by the Visconde do Rio Branco. 

The course adopted by the Allies in the Conferences of 
Buenos Ayres, and more especially as to the first question, was 
the only one possible. I am unable to understand why the 
Argentine Republic aimed at arranging the adjustment of its 
boundary line with Paraguay separately, especially as the Ar- 
gentine Government declared, in solemn terms, on occasion of 
taking possession of Villa Occidental, on the right bank of 
the Paraguay, that it did not pretend to decide the question 
of boundary by right of conquest, but on the ground of the 
titles of both parties interested, appealing, furthermore, to the 
spirit of good faith, moderation, and justice of the Govern- 
ment of Brazil, and intimating that the conduct of the latter 
ought to be governed in like manner. 

By Article II. of the Preliminary Act of Peace, it 
was understood that the| question of boundary, at least 
on the Chaco side, to which the Paraguayan Government 
attaches, and with reason, the greatest importance, was not to 
be set at rest without the permanent Government which was 
about to be elected being heard beforehand ; even should it 
go to the extent of proposing, in the interest of the Republic, 
modifications in the Treaty of the 1st of May. 

Despite this international Act, and notwithstanding what 
had been assented to in the preliminary Convention of the 
Allies, Dr Manoel Quintana, the Argentine Plenipotentiary, 
desired thereupon that the Allied Governments should 
previously acknowledge themselves bound to regard as terri- 
tory belonging to the Argentine Republic that which Article 
XVI. of the Treaty of Alliance had pointed out as the basis for 
a definitive settlement with Paraguay. 

Could the Governments o f Brazil and of the Oriental Republic 
of Uruguay impose on that of Paraguay, without granting it a 
hearing, that it should recognise such boundary line, rendering 
thereby quite illusory the guarantee which had been given, 
namely, that their title to possession over that territory should 
be taken into consideration, the question to be decided in 
their favour, if they proved stronger in arms ? 



11 



Could Brazil and the Oriental Eepublic of Paraguay act 
in this wise, when it was known that the territory in dispute 
between the Argentine Republic and that of Paraguay was con- 
tended for by Bolivia likewise, whose claim had been reserved 
at the signing of the Treaty of the 1st of May, 1865, wherein 
the Argentine Government had claimed entirely as its own the 
territory from the Chaco up to Bahia Negra, from which point 
the Brazilian possessions commence in that direction ? 

This it was that the Argentine Plenipotentiary pretended 
to, nullifying in an essential point the Convention of Buenos 
Ayres, and asking for a peremptory decision on this delicate 
matter, which recurs, moreover, in Article VIII. of the Treaty of 
the 1st of May, whereby the Allies bound themselves to respect 
the independence and integrity of Paraguay, eliminating from 
the understanding come to all idea whatever of conquest. 

Not less uncompromising did the Argentine Plenipoten- 
tiary show himself to be in regard to the second of the 
questions above indicated, refusing to acknowledge the validity 
of the clause of the Protocol relating to the Paraguayan fortifi- 
cations, which always was and could not cease to be regarded 
by the Governments of Brazil and of the Oriental Republic as 
forming an integral part of the Treaty of Alliance. 

By way of justifying such a proceeding, this same Pleni- 
potentiary contended that the said Protocol had not been 
approved by the Argentine Congress. 

The Allied Governments could not, however, be held 
responsible, if, because the Argentine Government had refrained 
from doing what it ought to have done, the Protocol was virtu- 
ally wanting in legal sanction conformably with Article XIX. 
of the Treaty of the 1st of May, and if such sanction remained 
to be applied for. 

This omission, if there were any such, could not establish 
a right in favour of the Argentine Republic, nor constitute, as 
regards the other Allied nations, any obligation. The latter 
might antecedently believe in the perfect acceptance of the 
Protocol, as soon as the ratification of the terms of alliance had 
been exchanged without any reserve whatever being made, and 
the Argentine Generals gave, more than once, of their own 
accord, their assistance relatively to questions touching the 
division of spoil taken from the enemy. 

In consequence of the divergence of opinion then mani- 
fested between the Allied Plenipotentiaries and of the repug- 
nance exhibited in coming to an understanding with the 
actual Government of the Republic of Paraguay, the Argen- 
tine Plenipotentiary withdrew from Assuncion before the 
opening of negociations about the definitive terms of peace, 
leaving the Brazilian Plenipotentiary alone, inasmuch as Dr 
Adolfo Rodrigues, the Plenipotentiary for the Oriental Republic, 

B 2 



12 



had left, on account of indisposition, and under the impression 
that nothing whatever was likely to be done. 

Under these circumstances, namely, in the impossibility 
of treating conjointly, what did it become expedient to do ? 

The legitimate interest of the three nations could not be 
left indefinitely unsettled simply from the want of goodwill on 
the part of some one of the Allies, all the more so because 
it was recognised by Article VII. of the Preliminary Treaty of 
Peace of the 20th of June, 1870, that, in the interest of all, 
and hence of the Argentine nation, the definitive terms could 
not be settled for a long time. 

The Republic of Paragua}^ although conquered, had a right 
to demand that the Allies, when once their legitimate require- 
ments, as conquering belligerents, were satisfied, should leave it 
free, independent, and respected. 

There did not remain, then, to the representative of Brazil 
any other course to follow than that of using the right already 
pointed out, namely, of negociating separately, relying on the 
provisions of the Treaty of Alliance, on the previous agreement 
of the Allies concerning the definitive terms of peace, and on 
the generous manifestations made on the part of the Imperial 
Government with respect to Paraguay. 

Such were the precise instructions given to him in that 
sense. 

In order to remove all idea of conquest, the Imperial 
Government would not make a question about ceding from the 
line of the Igurey, indicated in the Treaty of the 1st of May, 
accepting instead the line from the Leap of the Seven Falls, 
on the Parana side. 

In like manner it would have no objection to abandon 
in the interest of Paraguay, the clause about the fortifications, 
upon which, for the benefit of the Alliance, it would not insist, 
if this sufficed to cause the Argentine Government to arrive 
at an understanding with Paraguay concerning the question 
of the Chaco. 

The Imperial Government regrets that, despite repeated 
efforts on its part, it has not been able to conclude the final 
settlement jointly. 

By taking separate action, it did not act so with any inten- 
tion of breaking up the Alliance, which now, for nearly seven 
years, it has sought with the utmost cordiality to maintain, 
sparing no sacrifices for the benefit of the common cause, and 
exhibiting during the whole of this long period the most signifi- 
cant proofs of friendship and good faith towards the Allies. 

Hence it was that we raised no question on the Argen- 
tines occupying, without previous agreement with the Allies, the 
important territory of the Missiones, between the banks of the 
rivers Uruguay and Parana, and this while the Braz : lian troops 



13 



alone were still pursuing the Dictator Lopez, and our Allies were 
not able to plead a prior right to those territories which were 
to become the subject of the definitive terms of peace. 

The Imperial Government is confident therefore, in view 
of all that has been demonstrated, that no blame can be 
attached to its mode of action, which, without violating the 
scope of the Alliance, consults the dignity, independence, and 
legitimate interests of each one of the Allies. 

Feeling justified in its conviction, and desiring greatly 
that the Government to which you are accredited should be 
put in a position to appreciate the loyal policy of the Empire 
in its relations with the Allies and with Para^uav, avowing, 
furthermore, that there is an entire want of foundation iu the 
hostile position assumed by the Argentine press, I authorize 
your Excellency to bring this dispatch to the knowledge of his 
Excellencv the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to your Excellency 
the assurance of my esteemed consideration. 

MAXOEL FRANC rSCO CORREIA. 



No. 2, 



NOTE OF THE ARGENTINE TO THE IMPERIAL 
GOVERNMENT RESPECTING THE TREATIES 
CONCLUDED BY BRAZIL WITH PARAGUAY. 

Ministry for Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic, 
Buenos Ayres, 27th of April, 1872. 

Your Excellency,— 

On the 23rd of February, a copy of a Dispatch 
reached me, transmitted by your Department, dated the 3rd of 
the same month, explaining the reasons why the Brazilian 
Plenipotentiary at Assuncion had negociated separately with 
the Government of Paraguay. 

After a still greater delay, I received, likewise, the Note 
bearing date 22nd of March, replying to that sent from this 
Department on the 15th of February. 

It was deeply painful, your Excellency, to the Argentine 
Government to take cognisance of these documents. 

The first, disregarding completely the Protocols of Buenos 
Ayres, and replying solely to the newspapers, sought to show 
that any one of the Allies might negociate separately, not only 
special Treaties of Limits, but, further, the very terms which 
ought to be considered of joint interest. 

The Argentine Government, bearing in mind the origin 
and character of that Dispatch, might very well disregard it 
in the discussion ; as it was written, however, before the 
acts were carried out, it contains expressions of opinion 
which it is necessary, as introductory to the discussion, to take 
note of. 

The undersigned may, then, be permitted to begin with 
that document, entering upon the consideration thereof in 
as calm a spirit as the Brazilian Government, and with the 
most friendly candour, as beseems the representatives of two 
nations erewhile united in the defence of their honour and 
their rights. 

The history of Treaties broken through a selfish interpre- 
tation of their clauses, or from the fact that they were not 
any longer necessary to one of the parties contracting, is a 
tiring not new in the world. 



15 



The Treaty of the 1st of May seemed withal to be 
secured from any such eventuality, on account of the manifest 
clearness of its stipulations, and by reason of the isolation of 
the transitory clauses from those of a permanent character, the 
latter being comprised under Articles I. to YIL, and the former 
in the remaining Articles. 

The stipulations relating to the war were, doubtless, to cease 
with it, as the Note of the 23rd of February has said, it having 
been agreed that, while it lasted, the Allies were not to lay 
down their arms until they had overthrown the Government of 
Paraguay, and that, until then, they should not negociate 
with the common enemy separately, nor conclude airy kind of 
Treaty, without the perfect consent of all. (Article VI.) 

IJp to this point it was impossible that any divergence of 
opinion could obtain. A Treaty offensive merely did not call 
for anything more than the first seven Articles. On the 
Government of Paraguay being overthrown, the Allies returned 
home, each one settling with the new Government the relations 
which it deemed advisable. The friendship that had grown 
out of the war as naturally ceased with it. 

The Argentine Government remained so persuaded that it 
had, by virtue of the Treaty of the 1st of May, contracted 
an inviolable engagement, until victory was declared, that 
neither the stress of the conflict, the straitened circum- 
stances of its finances, nor the opposition, which, both 
within and without the country, increased with adverse 
occurrences, sufficed for a moment to awaken the 
thought of withdrawing, and leaving its Allies alone in the 
struggle. 

The Treaty, in effect, contains ten Articles not bearing 
on the war, but referring to acts subsequent, which require, 
in express terms, a joint execution. 

Thus it is the Allies, and not one of them, who bind 
themselves to respect the independence, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity of the Paraguayan Republic during five 
years. (Articles VIII. and IX.) 

It is the Allies who, by common consent with each other, 
and with the other riverain Powers, were to settle the necessary 
terms on the Paraguayan Government being overthrown, so as 
to secure the free navigation of the rivers Parana and Paraguay, 
and to insist on the guarantees needful to insure their being 
carried into effect. (Article XI.) 

It is the Allies who reserve to themselves to arrange 
with each other the means best fitted to secure peace in the 
Republic of Paraguay on the actual Government being 
overthrown. (Article XII.) 

It is the Allies who are to name, at the proper time, the 
Plenipotentiaries required to conclude the terms, Conventions, 



16 



or Treaties which they have to make with the Government to 
be established in Paraguay. (Article XIII.) 

It is the Allies who are to exact from that Government 
the payment of the expenses of the war, of the damage 
caused to property and to persons ; and next, the vouchers 
connected with the subsequent violation of the principles of 
the right of war. (Article XIV.) 

It is the Allies who, in order to avoid the dissensions and 
conflicts which questions of Boundary involve, have the right 
to require that the Government of Paraguay should conclude 
with the respective Governments definitive Treaties of Limits 
on the bases thereby established. (Article XVI.) 

It is the Allies who hold themselves mutually bound 
faithfully to accomplish the agreements, terms, and Treaties 
with the Government of Paraguay, in virtue whereof the 
Treaty of Alliance was entered into, " which shall last for ever" 
according to the text, " in all its force and vigour, to the end 
" that the stipulations shall be respected and carried out by 
" the Eepublic of Paraguay." (Article XVII.) 

It is the Allies who, in order to secure this result, agree 
that in the event of one of the contracting parties not being 
able to obtain from the Government of Paraguay the fulfilment 
of the arrangement, or in case that Government should try 
to annul the stipulations agreed upon with the Allies, are 
under the obligation of employing actively their forces to 
secure their being respected, declaring that, in the event of their 
proving ineffectual, the Allies would combine with all the means 
in their power to render the execution of the agreement 
effective. (Article XVII.) 

It is the Allies, finally, who are to determine, by special 
Convention, the mode and form of assessing and paying the 
debt arising out of the causes mentioned. (Article XV.) 

The solidarity of the Alliance, your Excellency, and 
therewith the indivisibility of the negociation anteriorly and 
subsequently to the victory, were so impressed on the minds 
of the Plenipotentiaries, that they signed the Treaty of the 1st 
of May, which not only includes the joint duties of the Allies 
as towards each other, but also the duties of Paraguay van- 
quished towards the Allies collectively. 

Hence the Paraguayan people had the option of selecting 
the Government and institutions it might approve of, but could 
not incorporate itself with, nor ask for, the Protectorate of any 
one of the Allies. (Article VIII.) 

Thus, then, it was agreed between the High Contracting 
Parties that the franchises, privileges, or concessions they 
might obtain from that Government were to be common 
to all, and under the like conditions. (Article X.) 

It would be absurd, says the dispatch above-mentioned, 



17 



that the Treaty of Limits between the Argentine Republic 
and Paraguay should remain dependent for its ratification on 
the Brazilian Government, as it would, in like manner, be that 
a similar Treaty between Brazil and Paraguay should depend, 
in order to its validity, on the approval of the Argentine 
Congress, and on the ratification of the Government of that 
Republic ; and that both should require, further, the approval 
of the Congress and Government of the Oriental Republic, 
which has no question of Limits to determine with Para- 
guay. 

Leaving out of the question that the objection, t absurd 
though it be, avails nothing against the stringent stipulations, 
it would be very easy to show that it arises entirely from the 
confusion which the Note makes between the form and the 
subject-matter of the question. The Treaty of the 1st of 
May was approved by each respective Congress and Govern- 
ment concerned, and the Limits thereby fixed were ap- 
proved of. These Limits, however, did not require any fresh 
ratification of each respective Government and Congress afore- 
said. Whence, from the fact of the common guarantee, it still 
became necessary, in the event of the Paraguayan Government 
refusing to recognise them, either that the Limits should be 
determined by separate Acts, or that the Joint Act of the 1st 
of May should be reiterated. 

The Conventions, relative to the Limits, which the Pro- 
tocols of Buenos Ayres allowed of being arranged separately, 
aimed precisely at preventing that, not even in form, should it 
appear to depend upon any such ratifications ah extra, facilitat- 
ing at the same time, the considerate concessions which any one 
of the contracting parties might judge it expedient to make, 
in respect of all or any part of its rights ; it took care to 
declare, then, that they would form parts of one whole, and 
that the latter would not be worth anything without them, 
nor they apart from it. "Jointly or separately," as the same 
Note of the Imperial Government has rightly said, " the Allies 
"might act by common accord, while faithfully observing 
"their own engagements." 

The same Dispatch proceeds to refer to facts antecedent, 
still with a certain inaccuracy, and adds that, despite of 
them the Argentine Plenipotentiary now desired that the 
Allied Governments should acknowledge themselves as being 
previously bound to regard, as belonging to the Argentine 
Republic, that very territory which Article XVI. of the Treaty of 
Alliance has with much care pointed out as affording a basis for 
definitive settlements with Paraguay. The truth of the facts 
was far otherwise, and the undersigned finds himself obliged to 
re-establish it, moved thereto by the recommendation which the 
Imperial Government says was addressed to its Plenipotentiary, 



18 



on that occasion not to spare any effort so that the definitive 
Treaty of Peace might be ratified by all the Allies. 

The Argentine Envoy, observing that in the revision of 
the Protocols of Buenos Ayres, applied for, alike without reason 
or object by the Brazilian Plenipotentiary, and to which 
the former had, out of mere deference lent himself, a doubt had 
been raised, first by the Envoy of the Oriental Republic, and 
subsequently by the Brazilian Envoy, as to the solidarity of the 
Alliance in principle, protested against any such interpretation, 
as being to his mind contrary to the scope and purpose of 
the Alliance ; the Argentine Envoy, not being able to convince 
his adversaries, one of whom had no interest in the question of 
Limits, and the other only showed himself eager to secure his 
own frontier line, felt himself obliged to withdraw, following his 
own view of things and of the instructions he had received. 

The Argentine Plenipotentiary, however, while in Assun- 
cion, solicited nothing beyond what the Treaty of May 1st had 
established, which had not, in regard to that right, been 
modified by any agreement or subsequent promise, and was 
the very same as the Brazilian, Oriental, and Argentine 
Plenipotentiaries had recognised in all the Conferences held at 
Buenos Ayres. 

I am anxious further to refute the assertion that, on 
account of differences of opinion on the part of the Argentine 
Government, which had only existed during the War, and 
then for a short time merely, the definitive Treaties had been 
held over for two years. 

After the Conferences at Buenos Ayres, the negociations, 
and therewith the Treaties, were suspended through the un- 
looked for absence of the Brazilian Minister. The Argentine 
Government was always ready to respond to the slightest 
invitation of the Imperial Government ; such was its desire 
to keep up good relations with the Empire, and faithfully to 
fulfil, on its side, the duties of the Alliance, that it did not 
refrain from occupying itself with these matters even during 
the rebellion of Entre-Rios. 

The preliminary declaration, in fine, which the Argentine 
Plenipotentiary solicited, did not mean that Brazil and the 
Oriental Republic should fix the Limits without giving Para- 
guay a hearing, nor that the Alliance should deny by such 
act (ipso facto) the pretentions of Bolivia in respect to the 
territory of the Chaco. The Envoys entrusted with powers on 
the part of the Alliance had transferred their presence from 
Assuncion precisely for the purpose of giving a hearing to the 
representations of Paraguay, in respect to its limits generally. 
The question never turned on that point, but virtually on the 
obligations of the Treaty of the 1st of May, which for the first 
time was now disavowed. The question with Bolivia was 



19 



restricted to the Argentine Republic, and had been expressly 
held over by an interchange of Notes. Whence arose, then, 
the serious difficulty to object to the request previously 
addressed by the Argentine Plenipotentiary and break on 
this ground the indivisibility of the negotiations ? 

All this, meanwhile, your Excellency, is not so afflicting to 
the Argentine Government, as the spirit that inspires the 
whole Dispatch. Entirely forgetting the Treaty of the 1st of 
May, following upon the victory gained in common, our Ally 
recognizes that Paraguay attaches, with reason, the greatest 
importance to its Boundary question on the side of the Chaco. 
Till then the Bolivian Government had not addressed itself 
to the Argentine respecting its alleged rights to the same 
territory. It is, however, our Ally, who breaks this silence, 
for some motive or other, and undertakes to make known 
to us, officially, that it has received communications from the 
Government of Bolivia. Has our Ally perchance, then, the 
intention of upholding against its erewhile Ally all these 
pretensions, as though they were its own ? 

We arrive at the Note of the 22nd of March : 

It is a fact, your Excellency, that the friendship of two 
neighbouring nations dates from no particular period any 
more than does a hostile feeling. The battle of Ituzaino-o did 
not separate us for ever, just as it did not bind us for ever, to act 
in concert with Brazil, which had liberated the Argentine and 
Uruguay Republics from their dictators, Oribe and Rosas. The 
nations are all bound in fraternity, and members of the same 
family, and in every quarter of the world the human mind 
aspires after progress, just as in every heart there breathes 
the love of country and liberty. 

The alliance of nations in this sense antedates every 
landmark in history ; the alliance, moreover, of 1865 was 
something over and above this : it amounted to a reliance 
which the Government of the Republic reposed in that of the 
Empire. While the war lasted, it amounted to a blending of 
their respective territories and a complete intercommunion, 
in order to avenge injuries that were common to both. On 
the termination of the war, it resulted in a community of ideas 
and propositions in the interest of the peace and liberty of 
those regions. It was, further, a work of war and of peace, 
a work of the present and of the future, comparable in some 
sort, in the arena of politics, with battles gained or lost. 

It is likewise beyond question, your Excellency, that 
the Argentine Government did not judge it expedient to treat 
with the Provisional Government of Paraguay; the Imperial 
Government knows, moreover, and it is proved besides 
by public documents, that this opinion of the Argentine 
Government was not final, inasmuch as this same Provi- 



20 



sional Government refrained from negociating; and, un- 
doubtedly, to the exclusive action of the Argentine Govern- 
ment might be attributed the slight delay that occurred in 
the negoeiations, the inconveniences of which are sufficiently 
apparent from the preliminary agreement of the 20th of June, 
1870. 

The Note I am upon, entering more fully into the subject- 
matter, is pleased to repeat over and over again that, from the 
outset, it was well known that the only difficulty the definitive 
Treaty of Peace presented was that which consisted in the set- 
tlement, between the Argentine Republic and Paraguay, of the 
limits of the Chaco. No public document whatever shows 
this to be the case. By the Convention of the 20th of June, 
1870, the Alliance engaged to lend a hearing to Paraguay, as 
well with respect to the one as to the other limits. The 
Conferences of Buenos Ayres, in this regard, bore likewise 
not only upon the limits of the Argentine Republic, but 
those also of Brazil with Paraguay. It could not be otherwise, 
your Excellency ; the questions of limits between Brazil 
and Paraguay were of remote date. In the year 1856 they 
gave rise to lengthy Protocols and to a difference of opinion so 
marked that it afforded reason to foresee the war that subse- 
quently supervened. What miracle had then been wrought 
in the official world of Paraguay, influencing the same men 
and with their passions excited still more by the recent war ? 
Was it because Humaita was no longer standing, having been 
razed to the ground by the Allied Powers ? Was it because 
Brazil maintained on Paraguayan Territory an army of 8,000 
men and strong squadrons within its waters ? It was entirely 
owing to the Alliance, if there were any such miracle. And it 
does not seem either loyal or noble to avail one's self of advan- 
tages, which are due to all, in order to cause one's own 
frontier lines to be recognized, without, at the same time, 
taking heed that those of the Ally should be acknowledged, 
who was involved in the same case, but who possessed neither 
army nor squadron. 

Moreover, Brazil keeps up with all the Spanish Republics, 
which surround it like a girdle from one extremity of the 
Empire to the other, difficulties respecting Limits which it 
has not succeeded in smoothing over till now, or, if it has in 
one direction, it has been by exciting the enmity of the 
Republics concerned. The Argentine Republic, on the con- 
trary, in order to avoid questions of this kind, has frequently 
allowed its territory to be trenched upon, in a w r ay almost 
tantamount to an usurpation, so much so that, instead of being 
regarded as being itself an usurper, it has acquired a reputa- 
tion for forbearance. What marvel was this which allowed 
the Power, accused by all the Spanish Republics of invasion of 



21 



territory, not to encounter any difficulties with Paraguay, 
while the Argentine Republic did meet with them ? 

Your Excellency has indulged in reflections about the mode- 
ration and the generosity of the Imperial Government, which 
ceded from the line of the Igurey, marked out in the Treaty of 
the 1st of May, whereas the Argentine Republic has no desire to 
cede from the river Paraguay up to Bahia Negra. Casting a 
glance upon the map, one may see that the part ceded is 
restricted to a snatch of ground between the Igurey, to which 
Brazil never laid a -claim before the Treaty of the 1 st of May, 
and the Igatemi, which had been disputed by Paraguay an- 
teriorly to the Treaty. 

Brazil ceded then to Paraguay what was and ever had been 
its own, remaining, nevertheless, in the name of the Treaty of 
the 1st of May, with territory which had also belonged to 
Paraguay, although, never up to the actual war, was the latter 
willing to recognise the sovereignty of Brazil over it. Wherefore, 
then, does Brazil think it strange that the Argentine Republic 
should desire to secure to itself, in the name of the Treaty of 
the 1st of May, territories which, despite the pretensions of 
Paraguay, belong to it of right ? As well might one, just as 
reasonably, compare an atom to the world ? Finally, how 
does Brazil know that the Argentine Republic would not have 
yielded some of its Treaty rights ? Did not the negociations 
remain open in this particular ? 

The Alliance subsists, your Excellency says, for the special 
and express purposes which it had in view. What are, then, 
these purposes, according to the judgment of the Brazilian 
Government ? Are they those of war alone ? It remains an ac- 
complished fact, judging by the text itself of the Treaty, that 
the purposes in view were intended to keep the x\llies united 
up to the time of the final Treat}' ; nor could Brazil, except 
by giving to the words a meaning different from that which 
they hold in the language, arrive at a contrary conclusion. 
The bases are no longer bases, and their elaboration is some- 
thing altogether different from the bases themselves. The 
bases, then, are points that are to be discussed, and the 
elaboration, instead of strengthening them, is intended to 
destroy them. The inconsistency of such a notion is self- 
evident, and needs no commentary. 

In exchange, the same Note puts forth the idea of treating 
on the same footing, and the guarantee to be given, on the 
part of Brazil, to the Treaties that the Oriental State and the 
Argentine Republic may, in like manner, conclude separately. 
The Argentine Government does not apprehend the meaning 
of this offer, unless it be the result of involuntary forge tfulness 
of international courtesies. The reciprocal guarantee, as appears 
from the Treaty of the 1st of May, amounted to a continuance 



22 



of the Alliance, sanctioned the faith already pledged, dignified 
the Allies in their own eyes and those of the world, and awakened 
confidence even in the vanquished enemy, who was unable to be- 
lieve in a league of three nations with a view to humiliate and 
subjugate it. The ex post facto guarantee of Brazil, which has 
negociated separately, falling upon a separate negociation 
on the part of the Argentine Republic, would amount to a Pro- 
tectorate of the Empire extended to the Republic. The Republic 
neither wishes nor requires any such guarantee. If the Treaty 
of Alliance does not uphold its rights, if its Allies abandon it 
at the very moment when they might be useful to it, the 
Republic will be quite able, acting for itself alone, to get its 
rights recognized by the common enemy. 

If, on the other hand, Brazil has guaranteed separately the 
territory or integrity of Paraguay ; if it consider that, by force 
{ex vi) of Article VIII. of the Treaty, this guarantee means 
that we are to respect the pretensions of Paraguay in regard 
to limits, or that such pretensions could not be set 
aside until after discussion, and, in the event of persistence, 
without the question being submitted to arbitration, how does 
it think that it will, at the same time, be able to guarantee to 
the Argentine Republic the Limits fixed by the Treaty ? 
Would the joint guarantee, perchance, have been a vain word 
in the Treaty, just like the bases. 

The separate negociation, under whatever aspect it be 
viewed, is an infraction of the Treaty of Alliance, not in one of 
its Articles merely, but in them all. In the next place, the stipu- 
lation for the military occupation of Paraguay by Brazilian 
troops, subsequently to the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, 
is something more besides. It is a violation of the Protocols 
of Buenos Ayres, to which those who style an " international 
Act," the Convention with the Paraguayan Government, could 
not deny the same pre-eminent character. It is an igno- 
minious Protectorate for the party enduring it, because it is 
founded upon the distrust which it has awakened. It is a 
flagrant contradiction on the part of those who call for the 
downfall of the conquered nation, and which, unhappily, is 
assuredly sufficient to serve as a guarantee, not only to the 
powerful Brazilian nation, but also to its contiguous Republics. 
It is a flagrant contempt of the rights of sovereignty and 
independence to which a nation does not freely assent, and 
against which all conquered nations have a right to protest. 
It is, in a word, a permanent cause of distrust and hostile 
feeling which, in spite of everything, must, late or early, issue 
in war. 

.Your Excellency, in order to defend such a stipulation, 
alleges that it amounts to . c ca,rcely more than a faculty, 
reserved by Brazil, of keeping a certain force on the 



23 



Paraguayan territory with a view to insure the execution of the 
terms concluded, and to help to maintain the internal order of 
the Republic, as a necessary element to secure such execution ; 
and that this samef acuity gave rise to the preliminary Convention 
with the Government of Paraguay, in order to afford thereby 
a further proof of its upright intentions. It is not so 
easy to understand whence the Government of Brazil has 
derived any such faculty. If it be from any pre-existing act, as 
the Note further on declares, arising out of circumstances, and 
stipulated for between the Allies and the Paraguayan Govern- 
ment in the Conventions of the 2nd of June, 1869, and the 
20th of June, 1870, the purport thereof settled as the period 
of occupation, the definitive Treaty of Peace. The faculty 
invoked by the Imperial Government is the same as that 
which the Argentine Government possesses, in so far as it does 
not conclude its Treaty definitively, but is to cease on its coming 
to an understanding with Paraguay in the same way as that 
of Brazil should have ceased, subsequent upon its Treaties. And, 
on this account, the project of common accord, drawn up at the 
Conferences at Buenos Ayres, said : " Peace being definitively 
" re-established between the Signing Powers, the Government 
"of the Argentine Republic and that of His Majesty the 
"Emperor of Brazil will cause the forces, now occupying the 
" Paraguayan territory, to be withdrawn within three months, 
" to reckon from the exchange of the ratifications of the present 
" Treaty, or previously, if possible." How is it that your 
Excellency is unmindful of the concluding stipulation, and of 
that which precedes it, and only remembers the Convention of 
June, 1869, and June, 1870? 

Further than this, Senhor Paranhos, with a view to negocia- 
tion during these three months, wrote to the Argentine 
Plenipotentiary on the 27th of January, 1871, the following 
letter : — 

" I have the honour to forward to your Excellency not only 
" the draft of the last Protocol but one, but likewise of the last 
" itself. Therein your Excellency will find an alteration in 
" respect of the term of three months, instead of the two agreed 
" upon for the withdrawal of the forces (Article I.) The term of 
" two months might be insufficient to withdraw the 3,000 men 
" from Assuncion to Rio de Janeiro, and this without taking 
" into account the difficulties which the navigation of the river 
" might offer. The clause ' or previously if possible ' would 
" not sound reasonable by way of stipulation for less than two 
" months. The clause manifests the intention and the duty of 
" withdrawing without delay." What a contrast between the 
Plenipotentiary, thus expressly recognizing the duty of with- 
drawing without delay the forces on the conclusion of peace, and 
that Government which to-day pretends to secure the carrying 



24 



out of the terms thereof, and insuring internal order by retaining 
them there indefinitely. 

I find it needful here to mention likewise that a like dispro- 
portion exists as well in the occupying army as in the amount 
of influence that is brought to bear. While the Republic left in 
Assuncion no more than a single detachment under its flag, 
Brazil has left an army and a squadron ; whereas the Republic, to 
cany out its duty as an Ally, sent Envoys only when obliged, 
Brazil caused its principal Statesmen to take up their resi- 
dence in. Assuncion and granted a subvention to newspapers 
that were favourably inclined. The faculty then as exercised 
by the Republic, of occupying and of influencing, in conjunction 
with the Empire, cannot be put in comparison during the 
whole of that time. The real occupation and the effective 
influence were all on the side of Brazil, who went to the extent 
of disregarding the invitation addressed by the Republic, tend- 
ing to a total withdrawal from Paraguay, even before the 
definitive Treaties were concluded. 

To ensure the carrying out of the terms, if they were 
imperilled, might, your Excellency, be admitted as a reason for 
all this, but never the notion about the securing of internal 
order. 

Previously to peace being concluded, the internal order 
of a nation interests those who are fighting against it, and 
that interest justifies the occupation and the aids which, 
grounded on such a motive, may be afforded to secure such 
internal order. Such help, however, subsequently to peace 
being declared, amounts to an abdication of nationality; it 
begins with a Protectorate, and ends in annexation. Foreign 
nations are not the judges of internal order, and hence would 
or might oftentimes be upholding despotism, and not order. 
And if, to remedy such an evil, they wished to constitute 
themselves as judges, they could not do so without taking 
cognizance of the cause of disorder, passing judgment, and 
applying punishment ; in so far, then, all independence and 
territorial sovereignty would have virtually disappeared. 

Your Excellency appears astonished that the Argentine 
Republic should regard the pact of Alliance as infringed in 
consequence of the guarantee given by Brazil, separately, in 
favour of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity 
of Paraguay. The difference between a collective and a several 
guarantee is, notwithstanding, sufficiently striking. The 
collective guarantee left the Alliance on foot, the individual 
guarantee breaks it up. The collective guarantee meant 
the control exercised over the vanquished: the individual 
guarantee signifies an alliance with the vanquished against 
the Allies of the eve, who might attack their rights and 
claims, and who are thus at the same time urged to 



25 



negociate separately as if to bring about a conflict. It is the 
individual guarantee, which, like the individual occupation, 
destroys and annihilates the sovereignty. The collective 
guarantee, on the contrary, is a proof of security, because 
under it, just as under a collective occupation, the nation 
which endures it, is sheltered from unjust usurpations, from 
the fact that the balance of interests is never equal any more 
than are the Allies. 

Moreover, from the fact of negociating separately con- 
cerning the indemnity due to it, Brazil constituted itself 
the sole creditor, and acquired interests opposed to those of its 
Allies. 

If Paraguay be unable to satisfy with facility the 
costs and damages of Brazil, still less will it be able to pay 
the collective costs and damages to the Argentine and Oriental 
Republics. The total remained thus, without control, and its 
recovery monopolised for the advantage of one only. The 
Treaty of the 1st of May prudently disposed otherwise, when it 
established that the mode or form of liquidating and paying 
the respective share shall be regulated by a special Convention 
between the Allies. (Articles XIV. and XV.) 

Examining at large the infractions of the Alliance and the 
terms in which it was made, it behoves me to re-establish, in 
ao exhaustive manner, the history which the Note I am 
replying to gives of the negociation, ever in the hope that the 
wisdom and prudence of the Imperial Cabinet may adopt the 
conciliatory measure proposed to it or some other which it may 
deem of equal efficacy. The Argentine Government refuses, 
and will refuse as long as it is possible, to look upon that 
Alliance as brought to a close, which, even in the midst of 
common glories and perils, it took so much to render popular. 

The undersigned, the Plenipotentiary at the Conferences of 
Buenos Ayres, bears witness to all that took place therein, and 
is unable to admit the assertion that the representatives of the 
Allies took as point of departure for future terms with Paraguay, 
the fact that there was no other difficulty than the settlement 
of the Limits of the Chaco, as they all acknowledged that 
no resolution could be come to on this point, without hearing 
beforehand the party interested, not only on account of Article 
II. of the preliminary Convention of Peace, but also ex vi of the 
Article VIII. of the Treaty of Alliance ; and that, mean- 
time, as in the actual Conferences at Assuncion, the Plenipo- 
tentiary of the Oriental Republic declared that, so far as his 
Government was concerned, the questions of Limits could 
not constitute a casus foederis. 

Protocol No. 7 ought to be much more detailed than it 
is. The draft was drawn up by the Brazilian Plenipotentiary, 
who asked to be entrusted with that duty ; its preamble began 

C 



26 



by reciting solely, in the portion relating to the Limits 
the Memoranda and Convention of the 20th of June ; and 
without excluding these antecedent acts, at the suggestion of 
the Argentine Plenipotentiary there was recited, in the first 
place, the Treaey of Alliance which governs the whole matter, 
including even these Memoranda and Conventions. 

In the same draft there was inserted, as coming from the 
Argentine Plenipotentiary, the following : — " That in view of 
" the preliminary Act of peace and of what had been determined 
" in the present Conferences, about the separation into special 
" Treaties of the settlement of Limits, the more logical and 
" prudent course would be for each one of the parties interested, 
" to enter into negociations, in this behalf, with the Paraguayan 
" Government. That, if the Brazilian Boundary line was accepted 
" by Paraguay, it would not be the Allies who would contest it, 
" and the same ought to be said with reference to the Argentine 
" line of Boundary. That if there were any difficulty in respect 
" of both or one only of such settlements, then would be 
" occasion to consider them with a perfect knowledge of facts, 
" and to trace out for the Allied Governments a precedent for 
" any future proceeding." 

The Argentine Plenipotentiary took exception to this 
drafting, and proposed the following : ; — 

f That the Argentine Government maintained, notwith- 
" standing, its right to exact before, as well as after victory, the 
" limits fixed by the Treaty of the 1st of May, any difficulty 
" having to be determined with the co-operation of the Allies 
" collectively by one sole act, in conjunction with the represen- 
" tative of Paraguay, the result to be embodied in separate 
" acts, according to what had been agreed on from the 
" beginning." 

Neither at that time, nor subsequently, nor at any time, 
did the Plenipotentiary of the Oriental Republic declare that 
he did not understand from his Government that the question 
of limits was not a casus foederis, for, had he done so, 
he would have found as an opponent at the Conferences, 
not only the Argentine Plenipotentiary, but likewise the 
Brazilian, who, on more than one occasion, expressed himself 
most emphatically in this regard. 

The Envoy of the Oriental Republic limited himself on 
his side to saying what the signed Protocol expresses, 
namely, that, in this regard, it does not contain a single word 
less or different from the draft, that is to say : — " That he 
" could not refrain from assenting to the proposition of the 
" Argentine Plenipotentiary, because his Government had always 
" been persuaded that questions of territorial right between the 
" Allies could not be determined without hearing the other 
" party interested, that is the Government of Paraguay. That, 



'27 



" even had the preliminary agreement of peace not expressed 
" this, the reason and justice of the Allies would impose it 
" upon them as a duty." 

As concerns the negociators at Buenos Ayres, however, 
the Treaty of -the 1st of May effectually determined the frontier 
line, according to the good pleasure of the Allies, and as it was 
an international Act, passed with the authority of a matter 
duly considered, no one of them thought himself entitled 
to pronounce as to the justness of the pretensions of any 
one of the parties. No less did the negociators agree, as 
the Note declares to be the case, that, in respect to the settle- 
ment of limits, they were virtually and in express terms 
made to depend on the understanding that the territorial in- 
tegrity of Paraguay should be respected. Such an agreement 
was not possible, either antecedently to the guarantee or before 
discussion. The undertaking to respect the integrity of terri- 
tory was solely in order to prevent that, outside its terms, the 
conquerors should take advantage of their victory and divide 
amongst themselves the whole or part of the territory of 
the vanquished. 

Treating separately of the fortifications of Humaita, the 
draft of the Protocol, the originals of which exist in this 
Department, attributes to the Argentine Plenipotentiary the 
following considerations : — 

" The Argentine Plenipotentiary opened the discussion, and 
" explained what had passed in the Argentine Congress in 
" respect of that Protocol. 

" From this exposition, it results that the Argentine 
" Congress had treated, in secret session, of the fact of the Pro- 
" tocol not having been submitted, as the Treaty had been, to the 
" approval of Congress, and that, in consequence of these debates, 
" it had been declared by a Resolution of the two Chambers 
* that the Protocol was wanting in such approval. That the 
" Argentine Government did not hold to the declaration of the 
" Congress, however, said Senhor Tejedor, the Protocol is not an 
" act of the Argentine Republic. 

" His Excellency added, that even had the debates of 
" Congress not turned upon the merit of the stipulations 
" of the Protocol, but merely on the question of constitutional 
" competency, they displayed, notwithstanding, sentiments 
" very adverse to the clause which was then being discussed. 

* That the question being regarded, as it then might 
" and ought to be, from the point of view of international 
" courtesy, the Argentine Government likewise deemed that 
" the clause alluded to restricted unnecessarily, so far as the 
" Allies were concerned, the sovereign rights of Paraguay ; and, 
" further than this, that the Allies should content themselves 
"with the guarantees which they de facto already held, 

C 2 



28 



" namely, in the demolition of the fortresses, and in the 
" actually inoffensive condition of Paraguay." 

The Argentine Plenipotentiary, being little satisfied with 
this drafting, proposed, instead of the first and second para- 
graphs of the Protocol that had been approved of, to add, as a 
fourth, immediately after the second and third, the folio w- 

" That, finally, the clause relative to the future fortifica- 
" tions of Paraguay was in itself extravagant, and more espe- 
cially in view of the fact that, it did not preclude likewise 
" the Argentine and Oriental Republics and Brazil, which latter, 
" on the contrary, preserved its fortifications of Mato Grosso, 
" on the river Paraguay." 

The Brazilian Plenipotentiary in his reply, while speaking 
of the fortifications of the interior of the country, in substitu- 
tion of those on the coast, and of the silence of the Argentine 
Government concerning the Resolution of Congress, the 
Argentine Minister requested that the following might be 
added to his reply : — 

" That the fortifications in the interior of the country 
" could not be considered as of the same importance as those 
" placed along the coast, for the defence of the territory. That 
" the silence of the Government should likewise be considered 
" as a proceeding consistent with the ratification of the Treaty, 
" inasmuch as, at the opening of the Conference, he had had the 
" honour of submitting, for the consideration of his colleagues, 
" the very words employed by the Minister of Foreign Relations, 
" when a Senator of the Republic." 

On his side, the Envoy of the Oriental Republic, to the 
words contained in the signed Protocol according to the draft, 
added the following : — ' 

" That he did not disavow the obligation contracted by 
" his Government, but that the Allies might and ought, for the 
" time being, in the interest of all and in a just and conciliatory 
" spirit, reconsider that stipulation, just as any other of the 
" Treaty of the 1st of May. That, as the question was being 
" placed on the ground of courtesy, it was his opinion that the 
" clause in question should be withdrawn, inasmuch as it was 
" regarded as being unnecessary, and on account of the odious 
" interpretation to which it lay open." 

Your Excellency is then right in saying by your Note of 
the 23rd of March, that that which was an obligation, as far 
as the Allies were concerned, could not constitute a right for 
the Argentine Government, and that the latter would in nowise 
have been astonished had the Brazilian Government, on that 
ground, declared the Treaty of the 1st of May null and void. 
But your Excellency is not in the right in saying that the 
fault was attributable to the Argentine Republic solely, seeing 



29 



that it was seconded in its opposition by the Oriental Republic ; 
and still less are you in the right, inasmuch as events 
subsequently showed that the great obstacle in regard to joint 
negociation did not apply in respect to a separate negociation. 
A curious circumstance, which leads to the inference that the 
true reason for not declaring the Treaty null and void on that 
ground was to be found in the odiousness of the clause, and 
in that alone, thus indirectly justifying, as far as Brazil itself 
was concerned, the attitude of the Argentine Congress. 

u Eventually/' continued the draft of the Protocol, " the 
w Brazilian Plenipotentiary argued before his colleagues, that 
M it beino- agreed that the settlement of Limits should constitute 
" separate and distinct acts, and should be dependent upon what 
" the Brazilian Plenipotentiary on one side, and the Argentine 
" Plenipotentiary on the other, might arrange with the Govern- 
" ment of Paraguay, the negociation notwithstanding having 
11 to be made with the concurrence of all the Plenipotentiaries, 
" it became expedient there and then to determine a point 
" which was of general concern. 

u That the Treaty of Alliance established in Article XYIT. a 
" common understanding respecting the terms to be concluded 
u in conformity with the same Treaty ; that, moreover, as that 
" Treaty did not offer, in respect to the settlement of Limits, 
- any other than the interior frontier lines, or those separated 
•• by the rivers Parana and Paraguay, it was still necessary to 
11 determine about the apportionment of the islands, according to 
" the principle stipulated for in each of the two special Treaties. 

u It was necessary, moreover, to bear in mind that the 
" rule which might be adopted in the Treaty with Brazil, and 
11 reciprocally that which might obtain in the Treaty with the 
' ; Argentine Republic, could not bind the other Allies, unless 
11 by previous and express consent. 

" The Argentine Plenipotentiary contended that the law 
" of nations established the rules whereby the islands should 
" be apportioned in respect to the adjacent territory, and it 
'' appeared to him, moreover, that they ought to be spared 
" from treating this point/' 

The Argentine Plenipotentiary did not deem these few 
words sufficient as a complete reply to the considerations^ 
so sell-interested and grasping, as were those put forward 
by the Brazilian Plenipotentiary, and he required that instead 
there should be added : — 

" That the engagement set forth in Article XVII. should 
" not be strained beyond the text, seeing that the present Con- 
" ferences were not held for the purpose of settling all possible 
" questions between the Allies, or between the latter and Para- 
" guay, but solelv in respect to those arising out of the Treaty 
'• of the 1st of May. 



30 



"That, as there were no islands which could form the 
" subject of litigation, there not being any in the waters of the 
« river Paraguay, the frontier line between Paraguay and the 
" Argentine Republic, he could not accede to the intervention 
" sought for in respect to its settlement, as neither the Treaty 
" nor any interest worthy of consideration should confer any 
" such right of intervention upon Brazil." 

In presence of this, the Plenipotentiaries, seeing that such 
discussion placed the negociation on a ground which none of 
them desired, agreed by mutual consent to narrow down and 
suppress even the answers and rejoinders, by signing on the 
20th of January, 1871, the Protocol No. 7; now, however, that 
a negociation of a violent character has opened anew the mis- 
understanding that had scarcely appeared, and which the 
vigilance and forbearance of the representatives of the three 
nations had succeeded in removing, it would not be amiss by 
way of showing the succession of ideas and events that might 
occur to re-establish the original text. 

Your Excellency appears to take much heed, in your Note, 
of the position in which the Allies would be placed in respect 
to Paraguay, if Brazil and the Oriental Republic were to take 
upon themselves the responsibility which was required from 
them, and, with no little solicitude, asks : " Shall we enter 
" anew into war with that unhappy State with which, for the 
" last two years, we are living in friendly peace, and which is 
" unable to offer any effectual resistance ? 

"Is the complete ruin of Paraguay determined on, or, 
" it may be, the annihilation of its nationality, whereas the 
" Allies entirely recognised it, and only made a question of 
" the limits of the Chaco, where, in fact, already the Argentine 
" Republic has established its sway ?" 

The solicitude which, in these lines, is shown by the 
Imperial Government for the fate of Paraguay is worthy of all 
praise. It is not, however, consistent with that resistance 
which the Argentine Government has always met with on the 
part of the Imperial Government, to render less burdensome 
the fate of the vanquished, when the Allies, by common con- 
sent, relinquished the indemnity for the losses occasioned by 
the war and the injuries suffered by each State. The Chaco, 
a wilderness, the Chaco, which Paraguay never could colonise, 
is as nothing in the balance in comparison with the enormous 
debt resulting from the war, which, for centuries, will keep 
it chained to the ground and hinder it from breathing freely, 
to keep it prostrate at the feet of any puissant and ambitious 
neighbour. Wherefore not condole with us beforehand about 
the fate of Paraguay upon such real ground ? The Argentine 
Plenipotentiary, meanwhile, could do nothing more in this 
regard in favour of Paraguay at the Conferences of Buenos 



31 



Ayres than to introduce the words "considerately" (Benevo- 
lamente) in the Article III. of the Protocol in question, which, 
subsequently, the Brazilian Plenipotentiary enlarged upon in 
the Conferences at Assuncion. 

The attempt to maintain the Alliance, which your Excel- 
lency repeats in your Note, is not consistent with the course 
recently followed. When the Brazilian Plenipotentiary passed 
through this city he had two interviews with the undersigned, 
and the result of these was to agree upon a conciliatory measure, 
which called for his warmest sympathy. The conciliatory 
means looked for in the case of the Chaco, taking account of 
contrary interests, now keeps the Imperial Government 
occupied, and upon questions of a wider scope. By these means 
the Treaty concluded remained as concluded. The Protocols of 
Buenos Ayres were re-established, the Argentine Republic was 
treating, like Brazil, with Paraguay. In this separate negocia- 
tion the two Republics came to an understanding in respect 
to their Limits, and the result of the whole remained under 
the control of the Treaty of Alliance. 

What was taken exception to in 'the Brazilian negociation 
at Assuncion was the continued presence of its forces in 
Paraguay. However, this itself could not offer any difficulty 
when once the Argentine Republic continued asking for the 
withdrawal of troops, and Brazil declared it optional. The 
Brazilian Plenipotentiary pushed his enthusiasm so far as to 
say that it did not matter, even if there had come, before his 
arrival at Rio de J aneiro, a Note conceived in an opposite sense, 
since such Note might be withdrawn. Well, then, your Excel- 
lency, of such spontaneous enthusiasm and promises of such a 
nattering character nothing remained. The Treaties were 
ratified seventeen days after the arrival of the Plenipotentiary 

The Argentine Government, which neither desires nor 
ought to hide the gravity of the situation which these 
facts have created, would be making use of an unworthy 
dissimulation were it to seek to conceal the profound grief 
which they have awakened, by accepting as satisfactory the 
explanations offered. The reality and scope of the Treaty 
of the 1st of May are compromised in such wise that nothing 
could re-establish them, except the frank and energetic 
concurrence of the three signing Powers to secure its 
faithful and more complete accomplishment. The Argentine 
Republic, which requires this reparation, expects it still from 
the wisdom of the Brazilian Government in return for the 
loyalty with which it has accomplished, during seven years, 
its engagements under the Alliance. It hopes for it also from 
its young sister, the Oriental Republic, whose interests in the 
Plate are the same, and whose heroic conduct always surpassed 
its standing as a Power. 



But if, unfortunately, the hour of the death-knell of the 
Alliance has sounded, and the Allies of yesterday should 
refuse to recognise it to-day, the Argentine Republic still 
hopes that time will, early or late, reveal the inconveniences of 
such a policy, persuaded on its side, as it is, that the future 
will always belong to those nations, strong or weak, which 
have not departed from the standard of right, led by selfish 
interest. 

The undersigned takes advantage of this occasion to 
renew to your Excellency the assurance of his highest 
consideration. 

C. TEJEDOR 

To His Excellency the Minister and Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs of the Brazilian Empire, Von Manoel Francisco 
Gorreia. 



No. 3. 



NOTE OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT TO THE 
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

Bio de Janeiro, 20th of June, 1872. 

The undersigned, Councillor of His Majesty the Emperor, 
Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replies to 
the Note received the 18th of May last, and addressed to him 
under date 27th of April by His Excellency the Minister for 
Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic, concerning the 
Treaties concluded by Brazil with the Republic of Paraguay. 

His Excellency will understand the effort which the un- 
dersigned is about to make, in the interest of the peace and 
friendship of the two nations, in reviewing that Note, 
having regard to the nature and character of certain of the 
unjust appreciations therein contained. If the reply of the 
Imperial Government, despite its moderation and conciliatory 
spirit, caused the Argentine Government to feel annoyed merely 
because a difference of opinion in regard to the manner of 
appreciating the Pact of Alliance was therein expressed, how 
painful must it not be to the Government of Brazil to take 
cognizance of the answer of his Excellency the Minister for 
Foreign Relations, when couched in such terms. 

The Imperial Government hesitated whether it ought to 
consider the Note alluded to as a pacific endeavour to maintain 
the ties of the honourable Alliance of 1865, or rather as one 
with a set purpose to break up that Alliance, and provoke an 
extreme decision, disastrous to both Powers. 

Such was the impression, your Excellency, created in the 
mind of the Imperial Government by certain observations you 
had made, which seemed like intentional offences against the 
self-respect and dignity of Brazil. 

Considering, however, that the Argentine Government 
declares in its Note that it was using the greatest frankness, 
and hence that its professions of pacific and friendly feelings 
might possess the same character, the Imperial Government 
determined to reply to the Note of the 27 th of April, prompted 



34 



by these asseverations, but more especially by those of a more 
elevated and solemn character, made by his Majesty the 
Emperor of Brazil and his Excellency the President of the 
Argentine Republic, in their recent addresses to the repre- 
sentative Assemblies of the respective nations. 

Meanwhile, lest a precedent of this kind might be esta- 
blished, it becomes the urgent duty of the undersigned to enter 
a protest against the extravagant insinuation your Excellency 
has thrown out against the Government of Brazil. As it might 
prejudice the examination of this great subject, which calls for 
the serious attention and solicitude of both Governments, if 
the undersigned were to criticise here matters of so disagree- 
able a nature, they will, so as to complete the present reply, 
form the subject of a Memorandum. 

In his rejoinder Senhor Tejedor interweaves two Notes, 
one of the 3rd of February, and the other of the 22nd of 
March, as though in reality this Department had addressed 
two Notes to him, about the question of the terms of 
peace with Paraguay. The undersigned addressed to his Ex- 
cellency the Note of the 22nd of March only, the communica- 
tion of the 3rd of February having been a circular Dispatch 
directed to the Legations of Brazil, occasioned by the angry 
comments and ill-founded assertions wherewith almost the 
whole press of Buenos Ayres had attacked the course of con- 
duct adopted by the Empire. 

The representative of Brazil at Buenos Ayres brought 
this Dispatch to the knowledge of Senhor Tejedor, in proof 
of the frankness and loyalty of our conduct, and, in accordance 
with diplomatic usage, tendered him a copy. The Argentine 
Government, instead of replying to that document by another 
of like character, tacked it on to the Note of the 22nd of March, 
the reply, that is, addressed by the Imperial Government 
to its Ally. The undersigned proceeds to consider certain of 
the observations bearing on the Circular referred to. 

Senhor Tejedor begins by remarking that the two above- 
named official documents of the Imperial Government were 
transmitted to him with a certain delay, but his Excellency 
himself states that he received a copy of the Circular of the 
3rd of February twenty days afterwards, which is certainly 
not so terrible an interval, especially when the difficulties 
which have of late prevented communication between the 
ports of the Empire and those of the Plate are taken into 
account. The Note of the 22nd of March was delivered on the 
15th of April, that is, twenty-three days afterwards, without 
any such dalliance, consequently, as your Excellency speaks of, 
and t*he representative of Brazil has officially explained this 
slight delay as arising out of the sanitary restrictions esta- 
blished in the port of Buenos Ayres. 



35 



Inasmuch as the two Governments are not tied down to 
any fixed dates in the correspondence now being held on so 
important a subject, the undersigned thought himself bound 
to explain the circumstance adverted to, as having been purely 
the result of accident. 

The question in course of discussion between the 
Imperial Government and that of the Argentine Republic may 
be summed up in brief terms. It is necessary to state it 
clearly, however, stripping it of various details, so that the 
discussion may tend to convince and induce the two Govern- 
ments to agree upon a course worthy of both — one that 
humanity, the civilisation of our century, and the manifold 
interests which their friendly relations have assumed, loudly 
call for. 

The main point is to ascertain whether the Allies may 
actually treat with Paraguay separately ; whether Brazil had 
sufficient grounds for adopting that course ; and whether, in 
the Treaty made by the Empire, the latter has violated the 
rights of any one of its Allies, or offended against any of the 
engagements of the Alliance ; in a word, what is the meaning 
of Article XYI.of the Treaty of May 1st, relatively to Limits, and 
of Article XVII., which sets forth the reciprocal guarantee of 
the Allies in reference to whatsoever may, conformably with 
that Treaty, be agreed on with the vanquished. 

Let us examine each of those points in view of the Treaty 
rights of the Allies, and we shall then see whether the facts 
accord fully with the principles laid down. 

The undersigned, equally with Senhor Tejedor, acknow- 
ledges that the Treaty of May 1st contains certain stipulations 
that relate to the time of war, and others which refer to 
peace. Up to the seventh Article of the Pact, the Allies treated of 
their reciprocal rights and duties during the war; in the Articles 
following they provided for the reparation due to them by 
Paraguay, after being vanquished, and for the guarantees of 
future peace with this neighbouring nation, which had inter- 
posed so many obstacles to navigation and commerce, disputed 
territories to which it had no right, and had, through its anti- 
quated and ambitious policy, provoked a war of the most dis- 
astrous character. 

While the war lasted, Senhor Tejedor agrees, on his side, 
that the prohibition against any one of the Allies treating 
with the enemy separately was positive, for Article VI. of the 
Treaty of May 1st declares this in clear and precise terms, but 
the like prohibition, as he opines, ought to be extended to the 
definitive terms of peace, even though it be not so expressed. 

To the undersigned it appears that, had it been the inten- 
tion of the Allies to extend that restriction to the Treaties 
necessarily to be concluded with the vanquished, such intention 



36 



would have been manifested with a like foresight and precision 
as we see displayed in reference to the supposed state of things 
under Article VI. ; but let us follow your Excellency through 
the reasoning drawn from the terms employed in the several 
Articles of the Pact of Alliance. 

By Article VIIL, your Excellency says, it is the Allies who 
bind themselves to respect the independence, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity of the Republic. 

Article XL speaks of the arrangements which the Allies, 
and not one of them only, will make with the new Government 
of Paraguay concerning the free navigation of the rivers. 

By Article XIII., it is the Allies who are to name, in time 
fitting, the Plenipotentiaries necessary to conclude the Terms, 
Conventions, or Treaties to be made with Paraguay. 

According to Article XIV., it is incumbent on the Allies, 
and not on one of them only, to exact from the vanquished 
payment of the expenses the war has caused them and indem- 
nity for losses and injuries public and private. 

It is still the Allies, continues his Excellency, who, 
according to Article XVI., are to require Paraguay to conclude 
with the respective Governments definitive Treaties of Limits. 

Finally, it is the Allies who, by virtue of Article XVIL, 
mutually guarantee the faithful fulfilment of the Conventions, 
Settlements, and Treaties which they shall conclude with the 
vanquished. 

From the words " Allies," employed in these and other 
Articles of the Treaty of the 1st of May, the Argentine Note 
concludes that the Allies cannot act otherwise than jointly in 
order to secure the realisation of the rights guaranteed by 
them in relation to the vanquished. The error is, however, 
obvious. 

Senhor Tejedor confounds the end with the means ; the 
equality of the rights recognised in the Treaty of the 1st of 
May with the joint action of the Allies, that might arise — nay, 
that should be preferred, if possible — but which is, by no 
means, indispensable, and is not necessary for the reciprocal 
guarantee of what might have been agreed upon conformably 
with the Treaty of Alliance. 

The Treaty of the 1st of May, while establishing common 
rights and reciprocal duties, could not but refer to all, as well 
as to each of the Allies respectively. The form of the 
negociation, or the manner of conducting it, was a different 
affair, left at the prudent and enlightened option of those whom 
it concerned. 

Thus Article X. very wisely provided, which says: "The 
" High Contracting Parties agree that the franchises, privileges, 
" and concessions they might obtain from the Government of 
" Paraguay are to be common to all, voluntarily, if so con- 



37 



"ceded, or with the like compensation or equivalent rights, 
" should there be conditions attached." 

Senhor Tejedor cannot ignore that his interpretation, 
admitting of a joint negociation only, was controverted by 
Article XVI., where the Treaties of Limits (those of Brazil 
and the Argentine Republic) are expressly mentioned, which 
points out two Acts, necessarily distinct ; but, observes bis 
Excellency, herein the Brazilian Note confounds the form with 
the subject-matter of the question. The acts may be separate 
without the negociation ceasing to be joint. 

The undersigned does not take exception to the difference 
his Excellency establishes in terms ; but this goes to prove 
that his Excellency took such a view of the solidarity of the 
Allies, as to nullify the very point expressly determined b}^ 
Article XVI. 

If the separation of the Act does not exclude the 
reciprocal guarantee, as is undoubtedly the case, the question 
is reduced to one merely of form ; and it becomes necessary to 
acknowledge that the separate negociation on the part of 
Brazil in no way alters the reciprocal obligations of the Allies ; 
while it is equally certain that Brazil exacted nothing from 
the vanquished beyond what the Pact of Alliance and the 
sovereign rights inherent in each of the parties contracting 
might have justified. 

Senhor Tejedor has not distinguished between the obliga- 
tions the Allies contracted with one another, and which are 
not dependent on the agreement entered into with Paraguay, 
from those, which the Treaty imposes on the latter as rights of 
conquering belligerents. Hence it was that your Excellency 
quoted Article XII. by way of proof that the Allies could not 
treat with Paraguay separately. 

The text of Article XII. is as follows: "The Allies 
" reserve to themselves to arrange with each other the means 
" most fitting to secure peace in the Republic of Paraguay upon 
" the actual Government being overthrown." 

This Article of the Alliance treats of an agreement between 
the Allies for the adoption of any other guarantee they might 
deem expedient, beyond those provided and expressed in the 
Treaty itself, for insuring future peace with Paraguay. 

In what way has the separate negociation made by Brazil 
prejudiced such contingent agreement, which was not thought 
of, either in the Conferences at Buenos Ayres, nor in those at 
Assuncion ? 

The reciprocal guarantee of Article XVII. for the terms 
to be concluded with Paraguay, conformably with the Treaty 
of May 1st, is a further stipulation confined to the Allies solely, 
which subsists as well with regard to a joint negociation as in 
any other way. Which of the Allies has questioned the exist- 



88 



ence and value of this guarantee, when understood in its exact 
terms ? 

The Imperial Government does not deny that the joint 
negotiation, as a general Act of peace that a common Treaty 
might establish, as determined at the Buenos Ayres Con- 
ferences, would be preferable ; but it must not be inferred 
from the greater propriety of that form of negotiation, that 
it possesses the character of being the only one admissible, 
and still less, that it should be applied to every one of the 
Conventions made by the Allies. 

Assuredly in the Treaty of May 1st, there are provisions 
which could not be well elaborated, and which even might 
be wrongly interpreted, had no previous Convention between 
the Allies existed. Fortunately, however, such a Convention took 
place at the Buenos Ayres Conferences, the Protocols of which 
have been published, and the undersigned has shown, in refer- 
ence to Articles XII. and XVII., and will show it in respect to 
the others quoted, that the Brazilian Plenipotentiary has 
perfectly respected that Convention, the observations to the 
contrary in the Argentine Note being devoid of foundation and 
exceedingly unjust. 

The false light under which the acts of the Imperial 
Government have been viewed and judged by the Argen- 
tine Republic has produced no other effect than to place in 
stronger relief the good faith and legitimate dealing of Brazil. 

Senhor Tejedor deems that there was a violation of the 
Treaty of May 1st in Articles XIV. and XV., because Brazil 
stipulated alone and on its own account for the indemnity due 
to it, for the costs of the war, the losses and injuries of the 
State and of private individuals. 

Evidence to the contrary results from those very Articles, 
from the previous Convention of the Allies, and from what was 
stipulated for between Brazil and Paraguay. 

" The Allies," says Article XIV., " would require from that 
" Government the payment of the expenses of the war which 
" they find themselves obliged to incur, as also compensation 
" and indemnity for losses and injuries to private and public 
" property, and to the persons of their citizens, without war 
" being expressly declared, and for the damages and prejudices, 
" subsequently proved, as having been in violation of the prin- 
u ciples controlling the right of war." 

It is a right recognized as appertaining to each Ally, to be 
indemnified by Paraguay for its great pecuniary sacrifices, 
and for the devastation of private and public property. To 
exact it, the concurrence of the whole of the Allies is not 
necessary, just as, in like manner, the generosity of any one 
of them cannot be stayed at the caprice of the others. 

It is not, then, by the mere exacting of such incontestable 



39 



right as a belligerent, made within the strict terms of Article 
XIV., that Brazil has violated the Pact of Alliance. 

It is alleged withal that, according to Article XV. of the 
Treaty of the 1st of May, " by a special Convention, the mode 
" and form of liquidating and paying the debt resulting from 
" the causes mentioned will be indicated," and that such Con- 
vention is to be concluded in common. 

Even this argument cannot hold in presence of the realfacts. 

The Brazilian Treaty, after defining in Article III. the 
nature of the indemnity, in the very terms of the Treaty of 
Alliance and of the preliminary Convention of the Allies, 
establishes in Article IV. "a special Convention, to be con- 
" eluded at the latest within two years, will fix considerately 
" the quantum of the indemnity treated of in No. 1 of the 
" preceding Article, after examining the official documents ; it 
" will regulate the form of payment and the instalments of in- 
" terest and of the sinking fund, and will point out the 
" revenues which are to be applied to such payment." 

The special Convention is not hence prejudiced ; the 
revenues of the Republic are not absorbed for the Brazilian 
indemnity, in forgetfulness of what the other Allies are 
entitled to ; in fact, it would be very strange that Brazil, who, 
in the midst of the heaviest charges on its Treasury, never 
showed selfishness, were to seek to-day to prejudice its Allies in 
the matter of the indemnity which, withal, for a long time to 
come, can only be, as concerns all, a matter purely nominal. 

Senhor Tejedor may further observe that the special 
Convention, of which the Brazilian Treaty speaks, will be 
concluded between Brazil and Paraguay, whereas that of the 
Pact of Alliance was in common. Beyond this fact nothing 
prevents the agreement taking place when a fitting occasion 
arises for concluding such Convention, for which a term of two 
years was allowed, it adds, that which had escaped the 
Minister of Foreign Relations, namely, that the agreement 
of Buenos Ayres empowered any one of the Allies to carry out 
such special arrangement separately. 

On referring to Article IV. of the Protocol No. 3 of the 
Conferences of Buenos Ayres, to which Senhor Tejedor was an 
agreeing party, we read the following : — 

" It is, however, permissible for any one of the Allies to 
" treat separately in respect of the subject-matter of the 
* aforesaid special Convention so far as it may concern the 
" Ally, previous notice being given to the other Allies." 

No less unfounded and extraordinary is the blame 
attached by the Argentine Note to the stipulation in regard 
to the guarantee of the independence and integrity of the 
Republic of Paraguay. 

What is it that the Treaty of Alliance prescribed, and 



40 



what did Brazil stipulate with Paraguay ? Let us bring the two 
texts together, and their perfect concordance will be apparent. 
Article VIII. of the Treaty of the 1st of May : 
" The Allies bind themselves to respect the independence, 
" sovereignt} r , and territorial integrity of the Republic of 
" Paraguay. Consequently the Paraguayan people have 
" power to select the Government and institutions it approves 
" of, but raay not incorporate itself with any one of the Allies, 
" nor seek for the Protectorate of any one, as a consequence of 
" this war." 

Article IX. : " The independence, sovereignty, and terri- 
" torial integrity of the Republic of Paraguay shall be guaran- 
" teed collectively, in accordance with the preceding Article, by 
" the High Contracting Parties, for the space of five years." 

Did the Brazilian Plenipotentiary perchance depart from 
the rule laid down, or has he in any w r ay weakened it ? No, 
your Excellenc}^ he has religiously respected it, and given 
the most solemn proofs of the disinterested views of Brazil 
towards the Republic of Paraguay. 

The stipulation of Article XVII. of the Treaty of Peace 
signed at Assuncion, in the name of Brazil, by Baron de 
Cotegipe, is as follows : — " The Government of his Majesty the 
" Emperor of Brazil confirms and ratifies the engagement con- 
" tracted by Articles VIII. and IX. of the Treaty of the 1st of 
" May, I860, concluded with the Argentine and the Oriental 
u Republic of TJrugua} r . 

" Accordingly it binds itself to respect for ever, on its 
" part, the independence, sovereignty, and integrity of the 
" Republic of Paraguay, and to guarantee them for the space 
" of five years." 

Brazil, by treating separately, confirms and ratifies the 
engagement it contracted with its Allies by the Treat}^ of the 
1st of May, binds itself to respect, on its part, perpetually, 
and to guarantee during five years, the integrity and inde- 
pendence of that Republic. 

Does not Brazil hereby manifest its adherence to its Allies 
by invoking the stipulations made with them, in order solemnly 
to embody them in the special Treaty with Paraguay ? 

By confirming and ratifying the precedent act, does not 
Brazil acknowledge itself bound up, together with its Allies, 
in a collective guarantee ? 

Brazil could not refrain from insuring its individual 
guarantee to Paraguay, nor could Brazil record its promise, in 
the name of its Allies, in any other form than by reference to 
the Treaty of the 1st of May. 

The joint guarantee does not exclude the individual action 
of each of the guarantors, wiien one is able to act, and the 
others are either not in a position to afford the guarantee, or 



4 J 



apprehend that circumstances have not arisen which impose 
on them such a sacrifice. 

The collective guarantee of the Alliance is a positive aid, 
and not a preventive or obstacle to hinder any one of the 
three Allies from doing on behalf of the independence or 
integrity of Paraguay that which the others are unable or 
unwilling to do. 

The Alliance, which bound itself to respect Paraguayan 
nationality and defend it against any attack on its independence 
and integrity, cannot take it amiss that Brazil should be 
ready to fulfil such joint duty, even apart from the concurrence 
of the other Allies, should it not be found possible to secure 
such concurrence. 

Brazil in this, just as in all the other stipulations, has 
been so scrupulous that, while not hesitating to renew the 
perpetual guarantee formerly given to Paraguay, it limited it to 
the term of five years, entirely out of respect to what had been 
agreed upon under the Treaty of the 1st of May; the under- 
signed has read with profound pain the observations which so 
loyal and inoffensive a stipulation has excited in the mind of 
his Excellency Senhor Tejedor. 

How can it be possible to see in the guarantee of Brazil, 
which will not be given separately, except in the event of its 
Allies failing to do so, a conspiracy of the Empire with the 
common enemy against its own Allies ? Such an assumption 
should not have been put forth in the Argentine Note, since it 
is morally impossible that any one of the Allies should offend 
against that very thing which all have guaranteed. 

Can, perchance, the Brazilian stipulation be involved 
in the Boundary question of the Argentine Government, a 
further assumption also to be met with in the .same Note of 
Senhor Tejedor? 

The undersigned is unable to explain how such a prejudice 
could be entertained by the Argentine Government. 

Since the occupation of Villa Occidental by the Argentines, 
it has been evident enough that Brazil, although it did not 
accept the responsibility of the fact, under the circumstances, 
in which it occurred and is maintained, respected it, nevertheless, 
because that territory is comprised in the Limits w T hich the 
Argentine Government declared, under the Treaty of the 1st 
of May, would form the bases of its settlement with Paraguay. 
The Imperial Government has been, and will continue to be, 
consistent with the course adopted. 

The stipulation respecting the maintenance of Brazilian 
troops in Paraguay, despite its being optional and dependent 
on the Government of that Republic, has assumed, in the eyes 
of your Excellency, a most sinister aspect. The effect of such 
prejudice is apparent through the whole course of your 

D 



42 



Excellency's criticisms ; but, when submitted to a thoughtful 
and impartial analysis, it will speedily disappear. 

It is expedient, above all things, to state the precise terms 
of the stipulation in question. 

Article XX. of the Treaty of Peace runs thus : — " The 
"Government of his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil may, by 
" agreement with that of the Republic of Paraguay, maintain 
" on the territory of the Republic, even after the date of the 
" present Treaty, such portion of its army as it may deem 
" necessary for the maintenance of order and the proper exe- , 
"cution of the terms entered into. 

" The number of the troops, the time of their stay, the 
" manner of meeting the expenses incurred, and whatever 
" other condition may be necessary, are to be determined by 
special Convention." 

In the first place, your Excellency observes that there has 
been a violation of the preliminary Convention entered into at 
Buenos Ayres, whereby the withdrawal of the Allied troops 
within three months, reckoning from the exchange of the 
ratification of the terms of peace, was agreed on. Senhor 
Tejedor even thought it necessary to enclose a copy in his Note 
of a private letter from the Brazilian Plenipotentiary for the 
purpose of showing that a shorter interval had been agreed 
upon beforehand, which, after all, was of little moment, inas- 
much as the desire entertained in common, doubtless, was that, 
on peace being definitively concluded, all military occupation 
should cease. 

But, in order to give that stipulation, readily accepted 
though it was by the Paraguayan Government, the character 
of a breach of antecedent engagements, your Excellency must 
forget that the preliminary Convention of the Allies was no 
Treaty, but a draft merely, subject to modification and alteration 
during the subsequent negociation with Paraguay ; and, further, 
you are unmindful that the Buenos Ayres draft presupposes a 
negociation in common, and on a perfect understanding of the 
Allies between themselves and with Paraguay, a matter which 
was unable to be carried out. 

Brazil having treated separately, on account of the exacting 
spirit of the Argentine Plenipotentiary about the question of 
limits, and of the refusal of the other Plenipotentiaries, the 
position of the Allies, in relation to Paraguay, is no longer 
what had been looked for. 

Treating singly and being unable tc reckon, meanwhile, 
on the moral support of its Allies, the result being a further 
enfeebling of the Paraguayan Government, Brazil was in duty 
bound to be provident. It would not have been prudent to 
trust the fate of the settlements it had just concluded 
to the chance mercy of such circumstances. 



43 



Brazil might, in such case, have availed itself of the right 
victory conferred, a right obtained at the cost of so many 
sacrifices — not to withdraw the whole of its forces until the 
execution of the terms of peace appeared well secured. Brazil 
would only have been doing therein what, under similar 
conditions, every belligerent has done. But the Imperial 
Government, as may be seen from the stipulation above-quoted, 
carried its scruples so far as not to use the right, excepting 
under agreement with the Paraguayan Government itself. 

The Acts signed on the 2nd of June, 1869, and the 20th 
of June, 1870, — the former during the war for the establish- 
ment of the Provisional Government, and the latter as a 
preliminary Convention of Peace, — did not, nor could they, 
determine anything respecting the withdrawal of Allied 
troops, because the Allies had a right to keep them there 
until the definitive settlement, and even subsequently, 
should circumstances render such a guarantee for some time 
necessary. There has been an evident mistake on the part of 
Senhor Tejedor in supposing that the Brazilian Treaty of 
Peace contravened what had been agreed upon by those Acts. 

Your Excellency giving to the few forces which Brazil 
still keeps in Paraguay proportions they do not possess, and 
ignoring, with the greatest injustice, the antecedent acts of 
the Ally of the Argentine Republic, evokes a Protectorate 
that never existed, and clothes it in the most hateful colours. 

The fact, however, is that the Brazilian forces have been 
a beneficent auxiliary towards securing the internal peace of 
Paraguay, not by reason of any material intervention, but on 
account of the confidence it inspires the population with, and 
from the discreet and moral support it lends to the authorities, 
without infringing, in the slightest degree, the independence 
and sovereignty of the Republic. Although few in number, 
Argentine troops are still kept there, and their General will 
bear witness to the perfect accord reigning between them and 
those of Brazil, an accord which, despite the circumstances that 
have supervened between the two Powers, and given rise to 
this overstrained discussion, continues to be maintained, con- 
formably with the instructions of the Imperial Government. 

The Argentine Government has not, however, any reason 
to be disquieted about the presence of Brazilian troops in 
Paraguay, as nothing novel has occurred in that regard ; things 
continue just as they were before, and our Ally, notwith- 
standing the means of action it already possesses by reason of 
its close proximity and the sway it exercises in Yilla Occi- 
dental, may avail itself of the same right by increasing the 
military contingent it now has in Assuncion and in the Chaco. 
That, which was till yesterday neither a subject of peril nor 
humiliating for Paraguay — although occurring without the 

d 2 



44 



assent of the Government of the Eepublic — will not be so 
now, when made to depend on its agreement, so far, at 
least, as Brazil is concerned. The assistance the Brazilian 
forces might eventually be called on to afford towards securing 
internal order, conformably with the stipulation contained 
in the Treaty of Peace, does not amount to that incautious, 
headlong, and ominous intervention which the Argentine Note 
presumes. It is the beneficent support which, in their own 
interest, and from a duty of humanity, the Allies may afford 
to a Government, under the circumstances in which the 
Government of Paraguay is placed, against any criminal 
attempt to disturb order and public safety. 

Assistance of this nature is neither new, nor contrary to 
public law. Without recurring to examples from any other 
part of the world, it is sufficient, by way of proof, to call to 
mind what was recognised by Brazil . and the Argentine 
Republic in respect to the Oriental State under the preliminary 
Convention of Peace of August 27th, 1828. By Article X. of 
that Convention, the two Governments bound themselves, for 
the space of five years, to protect the legitimate authorities 
against any disturbance of the public tranquillity and safety. 

Like stipulations are to be met with in the Treaty of 
October 12th, 1851, concluded between the Empire and the 
same Oriental State, with the full assent and guarantee of 
the Argentine Government. 

Even if the considerations set forth be disregarded, that 
Article of the Brazilian Treaty should not interpose an obstacle 
to a perfect accord between the two Governments, because it 
barely amounts to an option that may be used or not. So little 
does Brazil desire to retain its forces in Paraguay, that no haste 
has been made to arrange the special Convention mentioned by 
that Article. 

The undersigned has now passed in review the stipulations 
that have been pointed out as being a violation of the Pact of 
Alliance, or of the Convention previously entered into by the 
Allies, and the groundlessness of the appreciations made by the 
Argentine Note in protesting against them remains fully 
apparent. All the other Articles are in the like case and are 
but faithful transcripts from that Convention. 

Senhor Tejedor himself has admitted that in these Con- 
ventions there were no sufficient grounds for inferring that the 
Alliance was broken, as he said that he had arranged with 
Baron de Cotegipe a certain conciliatory measure whereby 
the Brazilian Treaties might be ratified without any modi- 
fication of the text. 

The cause then of the claims of the Argentine Government is 
something different, and the undersigned proceeds to consider this 
essential point with equal candour and the firm conviction that 



4-> 



there is either no ground for placing the relations of the two 
Governments on so perilous a brink or than it is a demand on 
Brazil to do that which is directly opposed to its honour, and 
which is not grounded upon the engagements of the Alliance. 

It is expedient, while entering upon this order of ideas, that 
the undersigned should first set right the allegation of Senhor 
Tejedor alluding to his last interview with Baron de Cotegipe, 
when the latter Plenipotentiary stopped at Buenos Ayres on 
his return from Paraguay. 

u The attempt to maintain the Alliance," says Senhor 
Tejedor, u is not consistent with the course recently followed 
" When the Brazilian Plenipotentiary passed through this city 
" he had two interviews with the undersigned, and the result 
i( of these was to settle upon a conciliatory means that called for 
u his warmest sympathy." 

Itmight have been expected that after this declaration Senhor 
Tejedor should say precisely what had been agreed upon between 
him and the Brazilian Plenipotentiary ; but his Excellency con- 
tinues in the following vague and obscure terms which in nowise 
explains what was the practical means of realising such a desirable 
object : — 

" By these means the Treaty that had been concluded 
u remained as concluded. The Protocols of Buenos Ayres were 
u re-established. The Argentine Republic was treating, like 
" Brazil, with Paraguay. Under that separate negociation the 
a two Republics came to an understanding about their Limits, 
u and the result of the whole remained under the sway of the 
" Treaty of Alliance. 

u What was taken exception to in the Brazilian negociation 
u at Assuncion was the continued presence of its forces in Para- 
" guay. However, this itself could not offer any difficulty when 
" once the Argentine Republic persisted in asking for the with- 
u drawal, and Brazil declared it to be optional." 

If the Argentine Government did not require the annulling 
of the Brazilian Treaties, and these remained as they were 
made, it is not their ratification which would hamper any con- 
ciliatory measure. 

The re-establishment of the Protocols of Buenos Ayres is 
a notion not easy to apprehend, since no one has nullified them ; 
it was rather the preliminary Convention of the Allies, therein laid 
down, which became the guiding line followed by the Brazilian 
Plenipotentiary, the only difference being in the separate nego- 
ciation which, in any case, would only have reference to the 
Limits, and the fresh stipulation concerning the continued 
presence in the country of the Brazilian troops. 

If the Argentine Republic were to treat separately with 
Paraguay, as Brazil has done, and, by a separate negociation, 
were to come to an understanding with that Republic in regard 



46 



to their respective Limits, and if the result of the negociation 
were to remain under the scope of the Treaty of Alliance, what 
is the obstacle to prevent such a course from being followed ? 

The Imperial Government does not oppose, assuredly, any 
separate negociation on the part of its Ally, but rather desires it, 
has always looked for it, and has, moreover, never failed to 
recognise that the agreements of the Allies, made by virtue of 
the Treaty of May 1st, whether concluded by an Act col- 
lective or several, are under the common guarantee of the 
Alliance. The option of keeping Brazilian troops in Paraguay, 
beyond the time necessary for the removal of the war material, 
was likewise never a matter incompatible with the wishes of 
the Argentine Government. 

After assenting to these propositions, Senhor Tejedor con- 
cludes thus : — 

" The Brazilian Plenipotentiary pushed his enthusiasm so 
£ ' far as to say that it did not matter if, before his arrival at 
u Rio de Janeiro, a Note had been received conceived in an 
" opposite sense, since such Note could be withdrawn. Well, 
u then, your Excellency, of such spontaneous enthusiasm and 
u promises of so flattering a character nothing survived. The 
" Treaties were ratified seventeen days after the return of the 
" Plenipotentiary." 

Beyond doubt, in this expression of opinion on the part of 
your Excellency, there lacks a something to render it intelligible 
to the Imperial Government, considering the observations above 
made, according to which the plan of your Excellency, in 
the general terms indicated, is as realisable to-day as it was 
yesterday, and there has been nothing which could point to its 
rejection on the part of the Imperial Government. 

To clear up this point it is needful to recur to the confi- 
dential Dispatch of 28th of February lastj wherein Baron de 
Cotegipe details what passed between him and Senhor Tejedor 
at the interview of that date. 

After explanations interchanged with the Brazilian Pleni- 
potentiary, Senhor Tejedor conceived the possibility of an agree- 
ment grounded on the fact of the separate negociation made by 
Brazil, and expressed himself to that effect. Baron de Cotegipe, 
showing himself satisfied with this initiative, but having a 
misgiving lest his memory might prove unfaithful, wrote down 
at your Excellency's table the agreement, as suggested, in the 
terms following : — 

" That if the Government of Brazil acknowledged the Note 
u addressed to it by the Argentine, and recognised the obliga- 
u tions of the Treaty of Alliance, although it had treated sepa- 
" rately, the Alliance.would not be considered as broken. That 
6t the Argentine Government would treat with Paraguay 
" and afterwards seek for the guarantees of the same Treaty. 



47 



" The Government of Brazil would revert to what was agreed 
" upon in Buenos Ayres concerning the withdrawal of the 
u Allied troops. That thereupon, on the explanations given, 
" the Treaties might be ratified. That the Argentine Govern- 
" ment would hasten to send an Envoy to arrange the questions 
" or the practical mode of agreement." 

Senhor Tejedor did not think his idea well expressed, and 
drafted it in these words: — 

" That the Government of Brazil should declare, in reply 
" to the Note of the Argentine, that it recognised the obligations 
" of the Treaty of Alliance, and was disposed to give the gua- 
" rantees it offers. Upon this being done, the Argentine Govern- 
" ment will send an Envoy to Paraguay, who shall afterwards 
" proceed to Brazil, to draw up, under the form of a Protocol, the 
" declaration contained in the Note. On such declaration being 
" made, there would be no further hindrance to the ratification 
" of the Treaties." 

It was not then a formal and precise agreement, as is evident, 
and our Plenipotentiary forthwith declared that he did not 
accept it on account of any special instructions but by reason 
of the knowledge he had of the intentions of his Government. 
Hence it would not be surprising if the Imperial Government, 
holding to its previous deliberations, did not find them entirely 
in accordance with the means proposed by Senhor Tejedor on 
that occasion in that form. 

The ratification of the Treaties was already resolved upon, 
and depended only on the obtaining of the respective signatures. 
The protest of the Argentine Government was a matter of 
notoriety, and the course followed by Brazil has been already 
misrepresented in an odious manner bythe Argentine press. To 
the protest a reply was indispensable, but, happily, it was in 
harmony with the general terms of the proposal of Senhor 
Tejedor put forward at the interview with the Baron de 
Cotegipe. 

On reading attentively the Note which the Imperial 
Government addressed to its Allies, under date of the 22nd 
of March, in reply to that protest, there might be found all 
that the Minister of Foreign Relations has pointed out as being 
sufficient to smooth over the misunderstanding of the two 
Governments. 

In fact, in that Note the Imperial Government declared 
that it was disposed to maintain the Alliance, and did not decline 
any of its obligations. Now this is precisely what Senhor 
Tejedor had proposed to Baron de Cotegipe. 

To remove all doubt the undersigned will reproduce tex- 
tually one of the conclusions of the Note of the 22nd of March, 
which has been quoted : — 

<( Brazil has not violated any point of the Pact of Alliance ; 



48 



" it maintains its engagements, and will ever be ready to come 
u to an understanding with its Allies as to the complete execu- 
" tion of objects of common interest." 

After what has been stated, the undersigned is unable here to 
explain the following ideas advanced in Senhor Tejedor's reply : — 

" In exchange the same Note mentions the idea of treating 
" on an equal footing, and the guarantee, on the part of Brazil, 
6< that the Oriental State and the Argentine Republic should, in 
"like manner, conclude separate Treaties. The Argentine 
u Government does not apprehend the meaning of this offer 
Cl unless it be attributable to an involuntary forgetfulness of inter- 
" national courtesies. The reciprocal guarantee, as appears 
u from the Treaty of May 1st, amounted to a continuance of the 
" Alliance, sanctioned the faith that was pledged, dignified the 
u Allies in their own eyes and those of the world, and awakened 
" confidence in the vanquished enemy, who was unable to believe 
" in a league of three nations with the intent to humiliate and 
" subjugate it. The ex post facto guarantee of Brazil, who 
" negociated separately, applied to a separate negociation 
" concluded by the Argentine Republic, would amount to a 
" Protectorate of the Empire extended to the Republic itself. 
se The Republic neither wishes nor requires any such guarantee. If 
" the Treaty of Alliance does not uphold its right, if its Allies 
" abandon it at the very moment when they might prove useful 
Ct to it, the Republic will be quite able, acting for itself alone, to 
61 get its rights recognised by the common enemy." 

If the conciliatory measure proposed by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in the interview alluded to with the Baron de 
Cotegipe did not require the annulling of the Brazilian Treaty,, 
nor even retard its ratification, and placed the agreements sepa- 
rately contracted under the guarantee of the Alliance, how can 
it be at present considered as impossible or inexpedient ? The 
Treaties which the Argentine Republic, as well as the Oriental 
State of Uraguay, may celebrate with Paraguay in accordance 
with the Pact of May 1st, would be the exercising of a right 
equal to that of Brazil, the right, namely, of belligerents and 
Allies, and would have the same force and value for the Alliance 
as if exercised jointly. The guarantee of the Alliance does not 
cease to subsist, nor does it change its character merely because 
it is applicable to collective or distinct Acts, to Conventions con- 
cluded simultaneously, or whensoever any one of the Allies 
may judge it opportune. The guarantee not tendered, but 
secured by Brazil, according to the terms of the Pact of Alliance, 
is not an offence against, but is the carrying out of the recipro- 
city stipulated with its Allies. 

In that passage of Senhor Tejedor's Note there certainly 
occurs an error of judgment, pushed to the verge of extreme con- 
sequences. 



49 



The Note of the Imperial Government should not have 
called forth the reply which the undersigned is discussing, had the 
mere declarations proposed by the Minister of Foreign Rela- 
tions sufficed to set at rest the pending question. 

The undersigned approaches the matter wherein lies the whole 
difficulty, which was the cause of difference of opinion between 
the Plenipotentiaries at Assuncion, as it was also on the point of 
becoming so at Buenos Ay res. On its decision depends the under- 
standing which the two Governments should seek to bring about. 

Does the Argentine Government understand that Article 
XVI. of the Treaty of the 1st of May, sketched out under the 
collective guarantee of the Allies the Limits of Brazil, and those 
of the Argentine Republic with Paraguay ? That is the question. 
Let us, while looking it in the face, quietly discuss it with that 
frankness which the Allies owe to their conscience and to their 
responsibility in the eyes of the civilized world. 

Senhor Tejedor says and does his best to prove that at the 
Buenos Ayres Conferences about the Limits, the very same was 
resolved upon which the Argentine Plenipotentiary had applied 
for in Assuncion. 

The history of these negociations shows the contrary to 
have been the case, and the undersigned will spare no pains to give 
a summary of them in view of the official documents, because 
therein are to be found both the test of the vital point of 
difference, and the means of solving it honourably and satis- 
factorily to all the Allies. 

Protocol No. 7 of the Conference of Buenos Ayres marks 
out the intention that dictated the preliminary Convention of the 
Allies, upon this important point of the settlements of peace. 

The Brazilian Plenipotentiary passed in review the antece- 
dent acts of the Alliance relative to the question of Limits with 
the Republic of Paraguay, referring to the Treaty of May 1st, 
to the Memoranda and Notes treating of the establishment of 
the Provisional Government, to the Notes bearing on the occu- 
pation of Villa Occidental, and to the preliminary Convention of 
Peace of June 20th, 1870. 

His idea clearly was that the Limits pointed out by 
Article XVI. of the Treaty of May 1st, could not be regarded 
as involving a complete right on the part of the respective Allies 
to remain under the joint guarantee of the Alliance, without the 
Government of Paraguay being heard ; hence from such discussion, 
it might be ascertained on which side justice lay. He showed, 
moreover, that the difficulty foreseen turned on the question of 
the Chaco, inasmuch as in the preliminary Convention of Peace 
there had been no other objection raised by Paraguay, and that, 
in relation to the Chaco, there were claims of Bolivia pending, 
whose rights had been reserved by a supplementary Protocol to 
the Treaty of May 1st. 



50 



In view of this exposition, although Senhor Tejedor un- 
doubtedly gave to Article XVI. of the Treaty of May 1st, the 
character of a case decided by the Allies, in respect of the 
Limits Brazil and the Argentine Republic had therein assigned, 
yet it was his Excellency himself who proposed adopting the 
course of not deciding anything on the subject previously to the 
discussion with Paraguay. 

Although it lengthens out this reply, it becomes necessary 
to transcribe the words of Senhor Tejedor: — 

u The Plenipotentiaries having duly examined the antece- 
" dent acts, in regard to their meaning and scope, Senhor Tejedor 
" observed that it was not between the Allies alone that the terri- 
" torial right of the Argentine Republic and Brazil had to be dis- 
" cussed. That such an anticipated discussion on the hypothesis 
" of the acceptance, or non-acceptance by Paraguay, was prema- 
£ * ture, and could not fail to embarrass all parties. 

" That the examination of the Argentine and Brazilian 
tl rights respectively should have been gone into before, while the 
"Treaty of May 1st was being negociated; that any retro- 
" spective view in this regard was withal useless, since, by the 
" preliminary Convention of Peace, the right was conceded to the 
" Paraguayan Government to discuss this point with the Allies, 
" and to propose such modifications as it might deem rea- 
" sonable or just. That hence it was logical and discreet for 
" the Allies to hold over in respect to this important question, 
" their definitive resolution, which had to be taken during the 
" negociation with the Paraguayan Government after its pre- 
" tensions, and the title on which it founded them, had been made 
" known." 

The Plenipotentiary of the Oriental Republic gave in his 
adhesion to this view, and to the means pointed out, in the 
following terms : — 

( f Senhor Adolfo Rodrigues declared that he could not but 
u assent to the proposition of the Argentine Plenipotentiary, 
66 because his Government had always been of opinion that ques- 
" tions of territorial right between the Allies could not be settled 
u without hearing the other party concerned, that is, the Govern- 
" ment of Paraguay. That even had not the . preliminary 
u Convention of Peace said so, the reason and justice of the Allies 
u would have imposed on them this duty." 

The Brazilian Plenipotentiary explained also the reason of 
his adhesion to the same view : — 

" He observed that it would have been desirable, as Senhor 
" Tejedor had pointed out, that the stipulations of the Treaty of 
u Alliance, in respect to Limits, should result from a conscien- 
" tioua examination of the rights of Brazil and of the Argentine 
" Republic ; but that, in fact, no previous inquiry had been 
" gone into, and that it was expedient to recognise that it was 



51 



" not less difficult then that at present, considering the import- 
" ance and nature of the subject and the pressure of circum- 
" stances. That the Allied Governments were acting in concert 
" with absolute trust and in the certainty that, in regard to the 
u final settlement, the like prudence and sentiments of mutual 
" friendship and moderation would guide them. He agreed with 
st the Plenipotentiary of the Oriental Republic that even if 
" the preliminary agreement of peace had not said so in express 
" terms, the Allies could not withhold from Paraguay all dis- 
" cussion about Limits, inasmuch as there is likewise an express 
" stipulation in the Treaty of Alliance that the territory and 
" integrity of the Republic should be respected." 

What results from this authentic act ? That, in the opinion 
of the Brazilian and Eastern Plenipotentiaries, the questions of 
Limits had not been settled by the guarantee of the Alliance, 
under Article XVI. of the Treaty, so long as the negociation 
with Paraguay did not show that the latter had accepted or 
had no good grounds for rejecting them. 

It appears likewise that the Argentine Note, without reason, 
denies that the Brazilian Plenipotentiary gave expression to the 
idea, which seems incontestable, that the obligation incumbent 
on the Allies, by virtue of the Pact, to respect the territorial in- 
tegrity of Paraguay, virtually comprises that of not exacting 
from it Limits over which it had no perfect right. This, how- 
ever, does not mean that Brazil or the Argentine Republic might 
not claim under Article XVI. of the Treaty of Alliance Limits 
which they, in good faith, believed to be well founded in law. 

The doctrine contended for by the Brazilian and Eastern 
Plenipotentiaries had long before been laid down by the Argen- 
tine Government in the documents to which the Brazilian 
Plenipotentiary will refer. 

The Minister of Foreign Relations of the Argentine Re- 
public had, by his Notes of December 27th, 1870, addressed to 
the representative of Brazil and to the Provisional Government 
of Paraguay, the following frank and explicit declaration : — 

" The Argentine Government, which has indisputable rights 
" to the Chaco, has fully approved of the course adopted by the 
" General in- Chief of the Army ; such approval, however, does 
-< not imply a refusal to treat at the proper time upon the ques- 
" tion of right with the Government established in Paraguay. 

" The victory of the Allied armies having now regained 
" this territory, its occupation had become a material and logical 
" fact, and to retrocede now would amount to placing our lawful 
" rights in question. 

" The Argentine Government, however, had maintained a 
" very short time ago, in discussions w T ith the representative of 
" his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, that victory does not confer 
" upon the Allied nations the right of declaring, of their own 



" accord, those Limits as being theirs which the Treaty mentions. 
" My Government believes to-day, just as it did then, that the 
" Limits have to be discussed with the Government hereafter to 
" be established in Paraguay, and that their settlement is to be 
" made by Treaties concluded after each of the contracting 
" parties shall have produced the titles on which they rely. The 
" Argentine Republic then, in occupying the Chaco, deter- 
" mines not the question of Limits ; it takes by right of con- 
" quest what it believes to be its own, being ready to surrender 
" it, in the event of Paraguay producing proofs superior to ours, 
" whenever the question of title comes to be considered." 

The preliminary Convention of Peace of June 20th, 1870, 
says in Article II. : — 

" The Provisional Government of the Republic of Paraguay 
" ratifies anew the previous declarations made on accepting the 
" Protocol of June 2nd of last year, and, consequently, accepts 
u in substance (en su fondo) the Treaty of triple Alliance con- 
" eluded at Buenos Ayres on May 1st, 1865, reserving to itself, 
" for final arrangement with the permanent Government, themodi- 
u fi cations in the said Treaty, which the Paraguayan Govern- 
" ment may propose in the interest of the Republic" 

To Paraguay was reserved, not only the right of being 
heard, but that of proposing modifications, and the Protocols 
explain that the reservation bearing on such modifications refers 
to the question of the Chaco. 

Such is the state of the question of Limits, as far as the 
Argentine Government is concerned, and this is the only ques- 
tion that has prevented the Government from signing similar 
Conventions, and under conditions identical with those which 
Brazil has concluded with Paraguay. 

The course followed, with the view to overcome the diffi- 
culty satisfactorily, was that pointed out in the above-named 
Protocol, No 7, of the Conferences at Buenos Ayres, wherein the 
following conclusions were assented to : — 

" 1st. That the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers w T ill 
" enter into negociation with the Paraguyan Government, con- 
" formably with the preliminary Convention mentioned in the 
" Protocols of the present Conferences. 

" 2nd. That, in regard to the settlement of Limits and the 
" clause of the Protocol annexed to the Treaty of May 1st, they 
" will proceed in the manner proposed by the Argentine and 
u Brazilian Plenipotentiaries ; consequently? that the said settle- 
"ment and clause will be the object of further deliberation 
" between the Allies, in case it be recognised as impossible to 
61 come to an amicable settlement upon these points, or any one 
u of them, with the Government of Paraguay." 

Let us now examine what took place between the Plenipoten- 
tiaries who assembled at Assuncion to carry out that Convention. 



After the Convention concluded at Buenos Ayres had been 
reviewed and completed, and when the Allied Plenipotentiaries 
were about to pass on to the negociation with the Paraguayan 
Government, the Argentine Plenipotentiary required from his col- 
leagues the recognition antecedently of the following principles : — 

u 1st. That the clauses of the Treaty of Alliance, relating 
" to the integrity of Paraguay, the Limits of the Allies, and 
rt the casus foederis, remain in all their vigour to be acknow- 
" ledged and maintained. 

u 2nd. That the subsequent discussions and stipulations 
" merely declared that Paraguay had a right to propose modifi- 
lt cations, or to produce a title to the said Limits. 

" 3rd. That the nation whom the possible exigencies of 
"Paraguay might affect is the exclusive judge as to their justice 
u and admissibility. 

" 4th. That the other Allies have no right to intervene in 
" the differences that may arise, either to weigh them or still less 
" to determine them. 

u 5th. That even, as regards the integrity of Paraguay, 
" the other Allies cannot meddle in the question, so as to require 
" the other Ally to make against its will any recognition or con- 
" cession with respect to even a single inch of the Limits esta- 
" blished by the Treaty of Alliance. 

u 6th. That if any one of the Allies shall not be able to obtain 
'* from Paraguay a recognition of the Limits to which such Ally 
" considers itself entitled, the others cannot negociate about any 
a one of the points which the Treaty of Alliance comprises. 

" 7th. That, supposing a refusal on the part of Paraguay, 
ct this rightfully restores things to the state they were in pre- 
" viously to any preliminary Convention of Peace. 

" 8th. That should such a state of things occur, the Allies 
si would have to agree upon the means best fitted for putting an 
" end to it, on the ground of the full efficacy of the Treaty of 
" Alliance, and of the most perfect solidarity between the Allies." 

Contrasting these principles and each exigence with the 
doctrine and scope of the Convention adopted at Buenos Ayres, 
let it be said whether there be not complete discordance. The 
question which had been held over, and which it was impos- 
sible to agree upon in such absolute terms, was revived. It 
becomes incumbent upon the Allies to uphold the Argentine 
Limits, while every right is at the same time withheld from them 
of intervening in the negociation and pronouncing upon the 
differences that might arise between the parties. All the pre- 
cedents, which the Allies could not fail to remember, were 
entirely abolished. 

The Brazilian Plenipotentiary took his ground on the Con- 
vention of Buenos Ayres, confirming, on behalf of Brazil, the 
doctrine and the prudent course therein set forth. 



54 



The Oriental Plenipotentiary was still more explicit than in 
the Conferences of Buenos Ayres, which it is important to bear 
in mind, because judging by the objection of the Argentine 
Government it might be supposed that the failure of the joint 
negociation resulted solely from the dissent of the Brazilian 
Envoy. 

The Protocol sets forth the following declaration as having 
been made by Dr Adolfo Rodrigues, in the name of the Oriental 
Government : — 

" That the instructions he had received from his Govern- 
'* ment, concerning the settlement of Limits with Brazil and the 
" Argentine Republic, warned him that in this matter he was not 
" permitted to take any direct part, and that his mission was 
" restricted to tendering his good offices, if they could contribute 
" to an amicable understanding, in case of any disagreement 
<( between any of the bordering States. 

"That this resolution was based, first of all, on the stipula- 
u tions of the preliminary Treaty of peace, which introduced 
" modifications in the Alliance of May 1st, 1865, especially in 
li so far as the obligations, contracted jointly by the Allies with 
" relation to their question of Limits, were concerned. 

" That, by that preliminary Treaty it was established, that 
" the Paraguayan Government adopted the stipulations of the 
" Treaty of Alliance without prejudice to the modifications that 
f* expediency and the generous dealing of the Allies might 
u think fitting, which reservation, according to the spirit of 
" the Conferences preceding that preliminary Treaty, had 
* 6 special reference to the Limits of the Argentine Republic, and, 
" therefore, inasmuch as that reservation implicitly involves possi- 
ei ble concessions on the part of that Republic, this faculty could 
" not include the Allies who do not advance any rights of their 
" own in the case. 

u That, in accordance with this opinion, it was declared under 
" the Convention concluded at Buenos Ayres on the 9th of De- 
" cember, 1870, that the provisions of common and general interest 
u should be corn-prised in one Treaty or general Act of Peace, and 
" the settlement of Limits, by special or separate instruments. 

" If, then, the Allies, upon the question of Limits 
u directly affecting them, have no right to introduce modifications 
u or to make those concessions to which the preliminary Treaty 
u of Peace alludes, because this faculty is within the domain of 
" the neighbouring Powers, and if, moreover, they have not the 
u right to take part in the Conferences held previously to the 
" settlements to be concluded, and are unable, consequently, to 
" appreciate the value of the respective arguments adduced, it is 
" fully evident that on no ground can they either sustain or 
" uphold a right that any one of the Allies thinks it possesses. 

" On account of these considerations and because he was 



55 



u otherwise aware of the spirit that had governed this point 
" at the Conferences held at Busnos Ayres during December 
u and January last, inasmuch as he had himself taken part in 
u them, the Oriental Plenipotentiary expressed anew the regret 
" he felt at finding himself obliged to dissent from the opinion 
n of the Argentine Plenipotentiary." 

Whence it resulted that the Argentine Plenipotentiary, 
not desisting from his exigency, withdrew from Assuncion, inti- 
mating to the Paraguayan Government that the negociation for 
the definitive settlement of peace remained suspended, such post- 
ponement, however, not being adopted by the Brazilian Pleni- 
potentiary. The Oriental Plenipotentiary had withdrawn a little 
time before through indisposition. 

Under these circumstances it was that almost two years 
subsequently to the final victory of the Allies in Cerro-Cora, 
and when the negociation in common had been shown to be 
impossible, the Imperial Government adopted the course of 
treating with Paraguay separately, without, however, break- 
ing off from the engagements of honour and friendship it had 
entered into with its Allies ; nay, expressly respecting those 
engagements, and leaving the way open whereby the Allies 
themselves might, in their turn, come to an understanding with 
Paraguay, that so, all settlements made in accordance with 
the Treaty of Alliance might remain under the guarantee of 
that Alliance. 

The Argentine Government protested against the separate 
negociation, but as may be seen in its own Note and from the 
present reply, that form of negociation does not prevent the 
Allies from affording reciprocally their friendly co-operation, 
acting consistently with their engagements, upholding and 
giving effect to the common guarantee when and in what 
manner it might become necessary. 

Incidentally, the undersigned will say that Senhor Tejedor 
is not right in pretending that the revision of the Protocol of 
Buenos Ayres was applied for, without motive, by the Brazilian 
Envoy, and that the Envoy of the Argentine Republic yielded 
merely out of deference. The revision proposed had in view 
certain amendments in the form of the Articles drafted in 
Buenos Ayres, and it was spontaneously accepted by Dr. Quin- 
tana, the Argentine Plenipotentiary, who proposed certain modi- 
fications, from which no inconvenience resulted, the matter 
remaining in the state it was left in by the Conferences of Buenos 
Ayres. 

The last Protocol of that revision is of November 6th ; 
the negociation with the Paraguayan Plenipotentiaries, who had 
been appointed long before, should have followed ; but Dr Quin- 
tana kept his colleagues waiting from that date till the 30th of 
the same month of December, in the expectation of fresh instruc- 



tions which, as he said, he had applied for from his Government, 
and, notwithstanding what had been agreed upon in Buenos 
Ayres, he ended by bringing forward the question of the previous 
guarantee of the Limits, as has been already stated. 

The undersigned, moreover, does not deem it necessary to 
lose time in replying to what Senhor Tejedor alleges, concerning 
the delay, in respect to the settlement of peace ; the Imperial 
Government refers to what it has declared on this point in its 
Note of March 22nd, whence it will appear that the Argentine 
Government did not wish to treat with the Provisional Govern- 
ment, and was even opposed to concluding with it the preliminary 
Convention of Peace, after the final victory achieved by the Alli- 
ance on March 1st, 1870. u It was on account of this persistence, 
" on the part of the Argentine Government, that the definitive 
" settlements were held over until the Republic of Paraguay 
" should have secured a political constitution and a new Govern- 
" ment." 

" The delay, attributed to the absence of the Brazilian 
" Plenipotentiary, which occurred between the previous nego- 
u ciation of the Allies in Buenos Ayres, lasting from December 
" 9th, 1870, to January 28th, 1871, and the reassembling of the 
"Plenipotentiaries in Paraguay, was, in great measure, caused 
" by the terrible epidemic then ravaging the cities of Assuncion, 
" Corrientes, and Buenos Ayres. 

" But these facts do not influence the actual state of the 
" question. What it is incumbent on the Allies to consider is 
u the real cause that has obstructed the joint negociation with the 
i( Paraguayan Government and, till now, prevented the Argen- 
" tine Republic from signing its own definitive settlement of 
" peace with that Government. 

" The Imperial Government and that of the Oriental Re- 
u public, whose Plenipotentiary showed himself to be in perfect 
u accord with those of Brazil, wish to know what the Argentine 
" Government require from them, inasmuch as neither of them 
" has assuredly shrunk from lending its co-operation to the end 
" that peace with Paraguay might be definitively settled with 
" all the Allies, without infringement of their rights, and in 
" a manner worthy of them. 

" The Note of Senhor Tejedor leaves this question in the 
" greatest obscurity and uncertainty. If indeed, it says, the 
" Treaties concluded by Brazil do not impede the desired 
" agreement, according to the propositions he had made to Baron 
" de Cotegipe, and which the undersigned has already considered ; 
" the same Note, from its conclusion, appears to shut the door 
" to any conciliatory measure on this ground, by addressing to 
" the Allies the following declaration": — 

" The reality and scope of the Treaty of May 1st are com- 
" promised in such wise, that nothing would be able to establish 



57 



them in their integrity, except the firm and energetic co-opera- 
" tion of the three signing Powers in securing its faithful and 
u more entire accomplishment. The Argentine Republic, 
" which requires this reparation, expects it still from the wisdom 
u of the Brazilian Government, in return for the loyalty with 
a which it has accomplished, during seven years, its engagements 
" under the Alliance. It hopes for it also from its younger 
u sister, the Oriental Republic, whose interests are identical in 
" the Plate, and whose heroic conduct always surpassed its 
u standing as a Power." 

What is the meaning of the frank and energetic co-opera- 
tion which the Argentine Republic hopes for from its Allies ? 
For what purpose is it solicited and in what way is it meant to 
be afforded ? The Note does not say, but it is this exactty which 
it is necessary to know and to determine. The Argentine Govern- 
ment does not assuredly deceive itself in respect to the only 
difficulty which stands in the way of its settling terms of peace 
with Paraguay. The difficulty lies in the Chaco Limits. Para- 
guay does not contest its right to the territory of the Missiones, 
and the other terms are out of all questions. Since then the 
Allies have not declined any obligation that they had contracted 
by the Treaty of the 1st of May and have nobly proved it, 
during the greatest stress of the war, why does not the Argentine 
Government enter into negociation with the Paraguayan, to 
ascertain whether a friendly understanding be possible or not? 
Such step depending, as it does, entirely on the Argentine Govern- 
ment might bar the whole question, and might perchance 
have avoided it, had the Argentine Plenipotentiary wished to 
hold to the rule laid down in the Protocols of Buenos Ayres. 

The Imperial Government believes so all the more, because 
the language winch the Argentine Envoy employed in the Con- 
ferences at Assuncion is very different from that of Senhor 
Tejedorin his last Note. The undersigned refers to the words 
of his Excellency relating to the Argentine Limits : 44 How, in 
" fine, does Brazil know whether the Argentine Republic might 
" not have ceded some of its Treaty rights ? Upon this point 
u did not the negociation remain open ? " 

The Imperial Government and that of the Oriental Republic 
never desired to call in question the right of their Ally to the 
territory of the Chaco, or to any other point of its frontier line 
with Paraguay. What they did declare is that they could not 
acknowledge, as being within the scope of the Alliance, that 
they should uphold these rights to the whole extent which the 
Argentine Government pointed out in the Treaty of May 1st, 
without Paraguay being heard, or whatever might be the value 
of the title the latter might produce. 

Can it be presumed, perchance, that Brazil and the Oriental 
Republic harbour the thought of questioning the rights of the 

E 



58 



Argentine Republic in respect to the territory of the Chaco, in 
case those rights were recognised by Paraguay 1 Such a 
doubt would be extremely unjust, for there never had been, nor 
could there be, any question upon that ground. In that event, 
the agreement of the Argentine Government would be upheld by 
Article XVI. of the Treaty of Alliance, the rights of Bolivia 
being held in reserve. 

But what has been contended for up to the present moment 
on the part of the Argentine Republic ? Has it not been that 
the other Allies, whatever may be the foundation for the allega- 
tion, that Paraguay refuses to recognise as being Argentine all 
the Chaco up to Bahia Negra, bind the vanquished to such recog- 
nition, if the Argentine Government demands it in the name of 
the solidarity of the Alliance ? If this be so, your Excellency, 
the Argentine Government must needs recognise that such a 
proceeding would not be conformable to justice and to the Pact 
of Alliance, not to mention the solemn promises that the Argen- 
tine Republic made voluntarily to Paraguay, and which, m con- 
junction with its Allies, it confirmed by the preliminary Conven- 
tion of peace. The question, if placed in these terms, would be 
tantamount to requiring its Allies to bind Paraguay by force to 
recognise, as being Argentine, a territory partly disputed by 
Bolivia, whose rights were expressly reserved by the Protocol 
annexed to the Treaty of May 1st. 

Not without repugnance does the undersigned present the 
question with so much candour, but he knows no other way 
whereby the three Allied Powers could arrive at an understand- 
ing, and bring about a solution alike honourable and satisfactory 
to all concerned. 

The undersigned laments that his previous frankness has not 
been appreciated justly by Senhor Tejedor, and has called forth 
observations upon which he does not desire to touch. His Ex- 
cellency has even gone so far as to doubt whether the only diffi- 
culty, which was always put forward by the Paraguayan Govern- 
ment in reference to the terms of peace, were the Limits of 
the Chaco, although this fact is evident from official authentic 
documents, and which all those who have heard that Government 
have testified to. 

Carried away by that erroneous appreciation, Senhor Teje- 
dor has manifested surprise that the Limits of Brazil did not 
meet with a like objection. Upon all our questions and settle- 
ments of Limits, he has built up the wildest notions, has given 
expression to the most unfounded ideas, has pointed to our 
geographical position, and attributes even, it would seem, to 
the Imperial Government the endeavour made by Bolivia to get 
its claim taken into account in the settlement of peace of the 
Allies with Paraguay. 

These and other points of the Argentine Note will be com- 



59 



pletely considered in the Memorandum herewith annexed; but it is 
necessary that they should not here pass by without some discussion. 

The surprise of Senhor Tejedor will cease as soon as his Ex- 
cellency has weighed the great difference existing between the ques- 
tion of the Limits of Brazil and those of the Argentine Republic. 
Brazil did not exact from Paraguay a single inch of the territory 
it occupied, either before or since the war ; it has required less 
than the frontier pointed out under Article XVI. of the Treaty 
of May 1st, those Limits, as Senhor Tejedor remembers, have 
been thoroughly discussed, and no enlightened or unprejudiced 
Paraguayan would call them in question. 

The Argentine Limits comprise the territory of the Mis- 
siones, over which the Paraguayans always had dominion, and 
the whole of the right bank of the narrow river that gives its 
name to that Republic, and which, rightly or wrongly, the 
Paraguayans had occupied before the war, and for long years 
have been accustomed to consider as their own. Superadding 
to this important difference the fact of the previous occupa- 
tion of Villa Occidental, notwithstanding the promise accom- 
panying it, the Argentine Government will find a natural 
explanation of the fact that has excited so much surprise. 

The undersigned does not contest what Senhor Tejedor 
has advanced for the honour of the Argentine Government, 
in respect to its questions of Limits ; but he cannot avoid 
protesting against the assertion that has been expressed in rela- 
tion to Brazil. Our frontiers are now generally marked out by 
Treaties obtained by argument and force of right. If questions 
of this nature are difficult to study, and consequently en- 
counter prejudices and doubts amongst all nations, not on this 
account is it justifiable to say that our settlements of Limits have 
awakened enmity on the part of the Republics interested there- 
in. Time has revealed, and goes on revealing from day to day, 
that the States surrounding Brazil have no more peaceable neigh- 
bour nor better friend. The undersigned may likewise say with 
pride that the prosperity of Brazil has greatly contributed to the 
civilisation and wealth of this part of America. 

Senhor Tejedor declares that the Argentine Government refuses, 
and as long as it is possible will refuse, to consider as being at 
an end an Alliance which had cost so much to render it popular, 
even in the midst of common and glorious perils. The under- 
signed expresses a like sentiment on the part of his Government, 
and thinks he has proved even to evidence that it is not to 
Brazil that can be applied the observation with which his Ex- 
cellency began his reply : — " The history of Treaties broken 
l( through a selfish interpretation of their clauses, or through 
u their not being any longer necessary to some one of the parties 
(l contracting, is not a thing new in the world." 

The Argentine Government, although ignoring the true 

E 2 



60 



reason of the course followed by Brazil, has avowed that we 
might, by alleging the Treaty of May 1st, have broken up the 
Alliance since it refused to carry into effect the clause relating to 
the Paraguayan fortifications. This fact, and all the other acts 
preceding the Alliance, show clearly that there is no sacrifice 
short of its honour and strict rights which Brazil has not made, 
and is not ready to make, in order that all the purposes of the 
Alliance of 1865 may be carried into effect. 

The Imperial Government does not think that the Treaty of 
the 1st of May, 1865, has for the three States any further impor- 
tance than in the security which has been obtained by arms, and 
the settlement of Limits, commerce, and riverain navigation, on 
which their future peace with Paraguay is to depend; and does 
not think that the recollection of the Alliance can be more grateful 
to the three Powers than that of 1852, which put an end to two 
tyrannies, and opened up a new era of liberty and progress for 
the Republics of the Plate. 

But it is not necessary to carry the purposes of the Alliance 
beyond its positive stipulations and engagements in order to 
affirm that it was determined on, in a cause concerning the 
honour and for interests essential to the three contracting parties. 

The inequality of the sacrifices, or the advantages, does not 
confer greater rights, nor exempt any one of the Allies from the 
obligations contracted. 

Such inequality, your Excellency, which certainly was not 
in favour of Brazil, will not influence it to-day, as it did not 
before, in its faithfulness to the Pact of the Alliance. Brazil will 
always accomplish its duties, as an Ally, with the good faith and 
gallantry of which it gave proofs during the war. If, however, 
the Imperial Government knows how much is due to the honour 
of its word, to the peace and friendship that concern all the 
Allies, it is no less alive to the feelings of its dignity, and its in- 
most conscience gives the assurance that it is not the cause of 
the difficulties which the execution of the Treaty of May 1st is 
encountering, after the great obstacle, the common enemy, has 
been overcome. 

If the glorious Alliance should happen to be broken, which 
one ought not to expect from the wisdom of the Allies, the re- 
sponsibility of that act and of its consequences would not fall on 
the Imperial Government ; soon or late the impartial judgment 
of other nations, and of the Argentine Republic itself, would 
render ample justice to the right, to the loyalty, and to the 
prudence of Brazil. 

The undersigned has the honour to renew to D. Carlos 
Tejedor the assurance of his most distinguished consideration. 

MANOEL FRANCISCO CORREIA. 

To His Excellency D. Carlos Tejedor, Minister of Foreign 
Relations of the Argentine Bejmblic. 



MEMORANDUM. 



THE Note of this date, in which the Imperial Government 
has replied to one addressed to it by the Argentine Go- 
vernment bearing date 27th of April, reserved for the present 
Memorandum, certain particulars, which therein could not be 
so thoroughly discussed. 

The Argentine Government complains that the Imperial 
Government has called in question the obligations contracted 
under the Treaty of Alliance, and even represents that Pact as 
having been violated by Brazil, but in the same official document 
in which it thus speaks and appeals for an amicable settlement of 
that divergence of opinion, are to be read the phrases and pro- 
positions, herewith transcribed : — 

" The Bolivian Government had not till now directed the 
u attention of the Argentine Government to its own alleged 
" rights over the same territory (that of the Chaco). It is, how- 
" ever, our Ally who breaks this silence, and, for some motive or 
" other, undertakes to make known to us officially, that it has 
" received communications from the Government of Bolivia. 
" Does our Ally aspire, perchance, to make all these pretensions 
" against its erewhile Ally its own ? " 

The unreasonableness of such unjustifiable suspicions will 
be very evident on review of facts that are incontestable, from 
which proof can be afforded, not only by the Argentine Govern- 
ment itself, but also by Bolivia, to which latter it is necessary to 
appeal in this discussion. 

The claims of Bolivia to a portion of the territory of the 
Chaco were long ago fully declared. In 1852, when the Treaty 
of Navigation, Commerce, and Limits was concluded between the 
Argentine Republic and Paraguay — that Treaty not being ap- 
proved by the Argentine Congress, the Charge dAffaires of 
Bolivia at Buenos Ayres protested in a Note of August 22nd 
against these arrangements. In this protest he alleged — that 
Bolivia had a right to the Western Bank of the river Paraguay 
between the 20°, 21°, and 22° of latitude. This also gave 
occasion to the Brazilian legation on its side to put in reserves. 

On no other ground was it that the Empire, when regu- 
lating by fresh stipulations with the Paraguayan Government 
the water police and navigation of the common river, took care 
to forestal any claim whatever on the part of Bolivia, by de- 
claring that such stipulations in nowise interfered with the right 
that neighbouring 8tate had advanced to the territory of the 



62 



Chaco. It was equally on this ground that, at the signing of 
the Treaty of Alliance of May 1st, 1865, the Allies reserved, 
by a supplementary Protocol, the right alleged by Bolivia. 

Why, then, should surprise be felt that Brazil should men- 
tion now the engagement with such reserve attached, when it 
appears that Brazil, in the name of the Alliance, and the 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay are being asked to combine 
with their Ally to oblige Paraguay to recognise the Chaco as 
Argentine territory, whatever be the title the vanquished may 
allege in its own behalf in respect of that territory. 

Does the Argentine Government, perchance, ignore the fact 
that Senhor Ricardo Bustamente, the representative of Bolivia, in 
joint mission to Brazil and to the States of the Plate, expressed 
himself at the Court of Rio de Janeiro, if not at Buenos Ayres, 
to the effect that the Bolivian Government deemed that it had 
a right to take part in the settlement of Limits made by the Allies 
with Paraguay, so far as concerned the territory of the Chaco. 

Further, by a Note of the 23rd of April of last year, ad- 
dressed to the Imperial Legation at La Paz, the Bolivian Govern- 
ment, on the ground that in the Treaty of May, concluded under 
the Alliance of May 1st, it had been stated that, on the termina- 
tion of, the war, the demarcation of Limits between the Allies and 
the Republic of Paraguay would be proceeded with, requested, 
wdiile reserving the rights of Bolivia, to be informed of the period 
at which such demarcation would be made. 

In that Note it was said that, inasmuch as the Republic had 
incontestable rights to the Western Bank of the Paraguay, up 
to its confluence with the Bermejo, it claimed to be represented 
during the arrangements mentioned to defend its complete rights. 
In replying to this Note, the Imperial Legation declared on the 
19th of September of the same year: — 

" That the demarcation of Limits between the Argentine 
" Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Paraguay was not 
" then being treated of, but simply the recognition, under defini- 
<; tive Treaties of Peace about to be concluded, of the Limits 
" which separate the said States. 

i( That Brazil is not a party in the question of the Chaco, 
" mentioned in the note of D. Casemiro Corral, that this question 
"concerned more especially Bolivia, the Argentine Republic and 
" Paraguay, as shown by the Treaty of Alliance itself. 

"That the Imperial Government, as far as appeared expe- 
u dient, had, at the signing of that Treaty, and in the acts sub- 
u sequent, bearing on the settlement of Limits made by the 
" Allies and Paraguay, continually reserved from the engagement 
<l contracted by the Alliance the alleged rights of Bolivia over 
ss the territory of the Chaco. 

u That the Argentine Government on its side had always 
a acceded with good grace to this reservation, referring to what 



63 



u had already been stipulated in principle between itself and 
" Bolivia, concerning the means of settling amicably as between 
" themselves the respective questions of Limits. 

u That the Imperial Government did not hold itself bound 
u to communicate in good time to the Argentine and Para- 
'* guayan Governments whatever the Bolivian Government might 
u directly refer to them, but withal did not refuse the request 
" made in the Note of Senor Corral, as Bolivia had not at that 
u time a diplomatic agent, jointly accredited by those Republics. 

" That, consequently, the Imperial Legation at Buenos 
" Ayres would receive instructions to transmit to the Argentine 
" Government a copy of that Note, and the reply that might be 
" given thereto, a like communication being made to the 
" Government of Paraguay" 

The announced diplomatic mission of Senhor Reyes Cardona, 
jointly accredited to Brazil and the Republics of La Plate, a 
mission the Argentine Government must have knowledge of, 
seems to have for its principal object the question of the Limits 
of that State with the Argentine Republic and Paraguay. 

The interest Bolivia has, then, in connection with the Chaco, 
as between the Argentine Republic and Paraguay, is nothing 
novel, nor does it afford a subject for surprise. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic 
says :— 

" The Note I am upon, while entering further into the 
" subject, is pleased to repeat over and over again, that it was 
u well known from the outset that the only difficulty the defini- 
u tive Treaty of Peace would present was that having reference 
" to the settling of the Limits of the Chaco between the Argen- 
" tine Republic and Paraguay. Nothing of this kind is to be 
" met with in any public document." 

The phrase, " is pleased to repeat over and over again " 
attributes to the Imperial Government a sentiment repugnant 
alike to its character and vigilance. The truth is, that not only 
these words, but also the negative following, have not the very 
slightest foundation, It will suffice to appeal to the conscience 
of the Argentine Government, which cannot ignore that 
it was its own question of Limits that encountered difficulties on 
the part of Paraguay. Was not, in fact, the previous occupa- 
tion of Villa Occidental determined on, even while the war was 
going on, upon that very account ? Would not also the fact 
appear that this occupation was forthwith opposed by a protest 
made on the part of the Provisional Government of Paraguay. 

It would even be sufficient to appeal to the conscience of 
the agents of the Argentine Government at Assuncion, who 
were in relations with the Paraguayan Government during the 
w T ar, to show that the Imperial Government then found its 
statement confirmed — namely, that the question of the Chaco 



64 



was, if not the sole, at least the main obstacle anticipated in the 
way of the definitive settlement of peace. 

But there is another written document, and in terms no 
less direct than the Paraguayan protest. 

The Argentine Government knows that General Vedia, 
its representative at Assuncion, signed, in conjunction with the 
Brazilian Plenipotentiary, Councillor Paranhos, Viscondedo Rio 
Branco, a Protocol of a preliminary Convention of Peace, dated 
May 31st, 1870. This Convention was signed by the said 
General, ad referendum, because, at the instance of the Provi- 
sional Government, the terms in which the Allies proposed that 
Paraguay should accept the conditions of peace stipulated in the 
Treaty of Alliance, had been changed. Well, then, the Protocol 
mentioned, which only differs in this point from that finally 
adopted on June 20th of the same year, failed to be accepted by 
the Argentine Government, because in the explanatory Protocol 
the Provisional Government had grounded its restrictions on the 
necessity of defending its rights over the Chaco. No doubt 
was raised with respect to the other conditions, neither was any 
question made about the limits of Brazil, nor about the territory 
of the Missiones, lying between the Uraguay and the Parana, 
which had likewise been occupied by order of the Argentine 
Government. Its own reservation referred solely to the terri- 
tory of the Chaco. The words of the Protocol are : — 

" During the discussion it was said, on the part of their 
" Excellencies, the members of the Provisional Government of 
Ci the Republic of Paraguay, that by the above-mentioned sub- 
u stitutive Article II, they apprehended that full liberty was left 
"to the Paraguayans to propose and maintain, in relation to the 
"limits of the Chaco < when treating of the definitive terms, 
u to judge what was conformable to the interest of the Re- 
" public, as from the generic meaning attached by the said 
" Article, it could not be inferred that this important territorial 
tc question under the terms of the Treaty of the triple Alliance, 
" had been set at rest." 

It seemed to the Argentine Government that the mere 
mention of the Chaco in the preliminary Convention, a question 
which it said that it respected singularly, might be kept out of 
view, as being less approved of by it. The Brazilian Plenipo- 
tentiary declared that, had the case arisen in reference to the 
Limits of the Empire, he would not have asked his Ally to make 
any suppression of the kind, which neither gave nor confirmed 
rights, such an inequality being impossible, as the two ques- 
tions of Limits were distinct. The Brazilian Plenipotentiary 
hinted at, without standing out for these just observations, the 
suppression of the amendment, as it was not worth while to 
embarrass the Convention on such a ground. The first Protocol, 
however, remained for all the negotiators an authentic act, each 
one receiving a copy. 



6o 



The assertion contained in the Brazilian Note is hence in- 
contestable, and is found to be confirmed by more than one irre- 
fragable document. 

Indulging in gratuitous subtleties and replications wholly 
uncalled for, the Minister for Foreign Relations has written, in 
respect to the cession of the line of the Igurey, made by Brazil 
to Paraguay, as follows : — 

<4 Brazil has then ceded to Paraguay what was and what 
M had been always its own, remaining, nevertheless, in the name 
" of the Treaty of the 1st of May, territory which had also 
" belonged to Paraguay, although never, up to the actual war, was 
u the latter willing to recognise the sovereignty of Brazil over it." 

We have it, however, that it is the Argentine Government, 
the Ally of Brazil, which asserts, in a public document, that the 
Empire had no right to the Limits assigned in express terms in 
the Treaty of the 1st of May, and which remained, by its final 
arrangement, as Paraguayan territory. 

The Imperial Government puts aside the effect created by 
such an assertion in the minds of the Paraguayans who are not 
acquainted with the groundwork of the question ; it will only deal 
with the rigorous logical deduction, without viewing the matter 
in that aspect. 

The Note of Senhor Tejedor shows that the Argentine 
Government is not acquainted with the ancient question of Limits 
of Brazil with the Republic of Paraguay, and it is not here 
necessary to demonstrate the right of the Empire to the terri- 
tories which the ambition and pretension of the late Presidents 
Lopez (father and son) had called in question. This right was 
at the time clearly explained in Protocols which are of public 
domain, and, moreover, the Brazilian Plenipotentiary has recently 
put on record at Assuncion the titles we might invoke in favour 
of the line of the Igurey, of the Jejuy, and of the Ipane-quassu, 
did we not think it incumbent on us to be moderate and generous 
towards the vanquished. 

It may be admitted that the Argentine Government was not 
aware of the lawful title of Brazil to the frontier line mentioned 
in Article XVI. of the 1st of May; but not that it engaged to 
become an accomplice in any usurpation of Paraguayan territory. 
From which assertion it may, moreover, strictly be inferred that 
the Argentine Note of April 27th helps to confirm the fact that 
the Treaty of the 1 st of May did not trace out frontier lines 
on the joint responsibility of the Allies; in other words, that 
they did not examine into the right alleged, but merely came to 
an understanding about the claims which might form a basis for 
the settlement of Limits, applying the guarantee of the 
Alliance, in respect to what might be, in the end, lawfully paid, 
or stipulated as amongst the parties interested, in conformity 
with the aforesaid basis. 



66 



Reproducing the sensible observations of the Imperial 
Government as to the contingency of any violent course being 
adopted by the Allies towards Paraguay on account of the con- 
tested dominion over the Chaco, the Argentine Note thus 
expresses itself : 

c f The solicitude which in these lines is shown by the 
" Imperial Government for the fate of Paraguay is worthy of 
" all praise It is not, however, consistent with the assistance the 
" Argentine Government has always met with, on the part of the 
" Imperial Government, to render less burdensome (hacer mas 
" llevadera) the fate of the vanquished, when the Allies, by common 
ec consent, relinquished the indemnity for losses occasioned by the 
" war, and the injuries suffered by each State. The Chaco, a mere 
" wilderness, the Chaco which Paraguay never could colonize, is 
" as nothing in the balance in comparison with the enormous debt 
" resulting from the war, which, for centuries, will keep it 
" chained to the ground and hinder it from breathing freely, to 
Ct fall prostrate at the feet of any puissant and ambitious neigh- 
u bour. Wherefore not condole with us beforehand about the 
" fate of Paraguay on this more positive ground." 

But these expressions of opinion on the part of the Minister 
of Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic give rise to 
more than one grave observation. 

In the first place, one of the Allies is seen attacking, as 
though it were unjust, humiliating and destructive towards the 
vanquished, one of the incontestable rights of every belligerent 
and expressly stipulated as a condition of peace, of the Treaty of 
May 1st, under Article XIV. It says to the Paraguayan people 
that it is not the question of the Chaco which is to meet with 
resistance, but that incontestable right of the Allies ; and this, 
too, at a time when Paraguay had not disavowed the right which 
now has become so repugnant to the Argentine Government ; a 
right it had previously acknowledged in concert with all the 
Allies, under the preliminary Convention of Peace, and ended by 
recognising anew in the Conventions just made with Brazil. 

In the second place, certain details of the previous negocia- 
tion of the Allies, which, by mutual agreement, but not at the 
initiative of the Brazilian Plenipotentiary, had been omitted 
from the Protocol having been brought to light, it is pretended 
that the Argentine Government had always met with resistance, 
on the part of the Imperial Government against the proposed 
waiver of the costs of the war. 

Here, it may be asked, when and how often, and under 
what form was this notable proposition presented to the Govern- 
ment of Brazil ? 

During the war the Plenipotentiary of the Argentine 
Republic was referred by the Brazilian Plenipotentiary to the 
Memorandum of May 17th, 1869, as to the essential conditions 



67 



of peace, and as to the interpretation of the Articles of the 
Treaty of May 1st, concerning them. The reply limited itself 
to the vague and general word that the Allies ought to be 
generous, and that we did not require guarantees, seeing that 
through our own acts we held them in possession. 

The proposal of waiving the costs of the war was men- 
tioned for the first time in the Conferences held at Buenos 
Ayres, in regard to the previous agreement of the Allies about 
the definitive terms of peace. It was the Oriental Plenipotentiary 
who initiated it, and whose testimony is invoked, as matters of 
detail are referred to which were not recorded in the respective 
Protocol. 

Senhor Dr Adolfo Rodrigues said that his Government 
would not hesitate about yielding that right if the other Allies, 
on their side, yielded it. 

The Argentine Plenipotentiary adhered without hesitation 
to this proposition certainly, but the Brazilian Plenipotentiary 
did not oppose it, as the Minister of Foreign Relations would 
have it be believed. The Brazilian Plenipotentiary observed 
that the proposition was very generous towards Paraguay, adding 
at the same time that it was conditional and very unequal towards 
Brazil. That the Imperial Government did not think of ceding 
an incontestable right, one which forms perhaps the best correc- 
tire against nations that provoke wars so unjust and sanguinary 
as that of Paraguay. That he, the Brazilian Plenipotentiary, did 
not oppose the concession made by the Allies of Brazil, but that 
he could not assent to it, and still less, when grounded on such 
a vast inequality. That, as for Brazil, in addition to the greater 
sacrifice of blood, it had expended tenfold more than any one of 
its Allies ; all that the latter might equitably propose to it could 
be that it should cede only just as much as they. 

On these observations being made, the two Plenipotentiaries, 
the Argentine and the Oriental, on the Plenipotentiary of Brazil, 
charged with the drafting of the Protocol, asking whether this 
matter should be noted down, answered in the negative, and thus 
all were of one mind. 

We have it then that not " over and over again," but once 
only was anything of the kind seriously and officially entered 
upon by the Allies, and that there was no such resistance as the 
Argentine Note would have it believed, nor any such absolute op- 
position, as has been attributed to Brazil. 

And it will not be wondered that the Empire, on which dur- 
ing the war fell the greater burden, but which did not meanwdrile 
take measure of them with those of its Allies, should afterwards 
be proportionally generous, a3 at the peace it acquired not one 
inch of territory, and had not exacted from Paraguay any other 
conditions saving those that security and mutual interest war- 
ranted. 



68 



The Minister of Foreign Relations says that the Paraguayans 
ought to regard their pretended dominion over the Chaco, which 
is besides a question of territorial sovereignty, as being of less 
account than the costs of the war ; and he so expresses himself, 
when, in another part of his Note, he compares the Chaco to a 
world by way of proving that Brazil has made a concession of 
no value, when ceding the line of the Igurey, which gave it a 
footing on the western slope of the Maracuju range, and linked 
it with all the Paraguayan territory from the Jejuy down to the 
banks of the A pa. 

But what blame attaches to Brazil if the Paraguayans hold in 
less account the pecuniary burden of the war than the territorial 
question mentioned ? Nay, if the Argentine Government at- 
taches so much importance to this very question, why should one 
be surprised by the opposition it encounters on the part of Para- 
guay ? 

All that the Argentine Plenipotentiary was able to obtain in 
the Buenos Ayres Conferences, observes Senhor Tejedor, was to 
introduce the words " benevolamente " (" considerately' 1 ) in 
Article HI. of the respective Protocol. 

The Imperial Government cannot cease from protesting in 
the strongest terms against the merits which, on account of that 
word, the Argentine Plenipotentiary has attributed to himself, to 
the detriment of the good intentions of the other Plenipotentiaries. 
This word refers to the assessing of the quantum of the costs of 
the war and was adopted as a mere amendment in drafting, with- 
out any opposition on the part of the Brazilian and Oriental 
Plenipotentiaries, because the thought of behaving generously 
towards the vanquished was one common to the Allies generally. 

It is pitiable that the introduction of this one word in the 
Article in question, and which did not occasion the slightest dis- 
cussion, should be invoked as an act of generosity, which is to 
speak in favour of the sentiments of the Argentine Govern- 
ment, but turn to the detriment of Brazil in the eyes of the 
Paraguayan people. No one, however, is ignorant of the fact that 
Brazil gave the most lavish proof of generosity towards the van- 
quished in the treatment of the prisoners, in ceding all its share 
of the spoil not material of war, thereby to help the needs of the 
Paraguayan Government, distributing aid to the unfortunate 
population returning from the woods, and in various other ways 
to which the Paraguayan Government and people will bear testi- 
mony. The nation that acts thus could not be full of greed in 
fixing the war indemnity and the conditions of its deferred pay- 
ment. 

The Minister of Foreign Relations has thought expedient to 
insert in his Note-.what the first minute or draft of the Protocol 
No. 7 of the Buenos Ayres Conferences says, in the name of his 
Excellency, as Argentine Plenipotentiary, in respect of the 



69 



clause concerning the Paraguayan fortifications. This minute 
having been amended by mutual consent and reduced to the form 
of a signed Protocol, it is not easy to apprehend for what purpose 
the Argentine Note recalls it and gives incomplete publicity to 
matters of detail, which had been struck out in the course of the 
ncgociation. 

Does the Argentine Government aim at showing that its own 
Plenipotentiary was opposed, while negotiating, to the clause in 
question ? This w T as manifest already by Protocol No. 7, signed 
by the three Plenipoteniaries ; to aim at something more than this 
would be to render one of the provisions of the Pact of Alliance 
prejudicial. And this discussion appears less called for since that 
clause is not in question, the Imperial Government renounced it 
in its negociation with Paraguay, and never has regarded it as a 
condition sine qua non. 

As then the Argentine Note wanders into such details 
without making any mention of the signed Protocols, and repre- 
sents these matters in a light unfavourable to the Empire, the 
latter is forced to rectify them and give them their true meaning 
and bearing. 

^ The clause relative to the razing of the Paraguayan fortifica- 
tions, and forbidding the construction of others, that might 
obstruct the free navigation, was a clause of the Protocol annexed 
to the Treaty of May 1st, by which Protocol the division of the 
spoil taken from the enemy was likewise regulated. 

Not until the definitive negociations of peace with Paraguay 
did the Argentine Government make knowm to its Allies that this 
clause was irksome to it, and that it could not carry it into effect, 
because of its wanting the approval of Congress. On the other 
hand, the Argentine general, when determining the division of 
the spoil, had more than once appealed to that annexed Protocol, 
and the razing of the Paraguayan fortifications was carried out 
by virtue of that very stipulation. 

The question of this clause was mooted in the Conferences 
of Buenos Ay res. Senhor Tejedor, however, not only took ex- 
ception to the clause as unnecessary and inexpedient, but even 
declared that his Government could not carry it out, inasmuch as 
the Congress, in secret session assembled, had resolved that this 
act had not obtained its approval, which had not been recorded, 
the Bill of the other Chamber, which had rejected it, being then 
pending in the Senate. 

Here was the case to say that, as the Argentine Note had 
expressed itself in respect to the stipulation of Limits, rightly or 
wrongly the clause mentioned had been excepted and had become 
an integral part of the stipulation of the Alliance, which, accord- 
ing as the faith placed in the exchange of the ratification by the 
Allies without any reserve having been made in this regard, might 



70 



The Brazilian Plenipotentiary maintained that the Argen- 
tine Government was bound to respect the clause in question, and 
justified his views, and the right of the Allies to comprise it in 
the conditions of peace under the Treaty of May 1st. Many 
historical and recent examples would justify such a requirement 
on the part of the Allies who did not thereby aim at leaving 
Paraguay defenceless, but intended to withdraw from it the 
dangerous incentive which its dictators found in the fortifications 
along the coast, to obstruct the river transit and provoke the 
neighbouring states even to the extremity of the late war which 
had cost so much blood. 

While upholding the clause in the name of the right of the 
Allies, the Brazilian Plenipotentiary presented it under a new 
aspect, accompanied by such guarantees for Paraguay as implied 
no manner of burden, but rather a reciprocity for the security 
offered to the Republic, and which removed all suspicion of any 
latent and hostile intention. 

In fact, at the instance of Brazil, it was at the same time 
proposed that the neutrality of the Republic of Paraguay should 
be acknowledged in the event of any conflict arising between its 
neighbours, or of the latter with any other power, the Allies 
binding themselves, moreover, not to recur to force in any event 
against Paraguay, before invoking the good offices of some 
friendly nation. To these guarantees of peace and security was 
added the independence and integrity of the Republic. 

Could Brazil, after having displayed this character, harbour 
any intention other than that which concerned the common good 
of the Allies and of Paraguay ? 

But although the clause had been recognised as valid and 
obligatory for the two Allies, the Oriental Envoy having given 
his opinion at that time in favour of its being abandoned, it was 
declaied to be of no effect, and unacceptable to the Argentine Re- 
public, through the medium of its Plenipotentiary. Such a require- 
ment, before even Paraguay was heard, and while the Argentine 
Government on its side was averse from making any concession 
on its boundary question, which was the great obstacle to the 
settlement of peace, placed the ether Allies in a position, which, 
if not awkward, seemed, to say the least, condescending. And 
yet the Argentine Government actually acknowledges, that Brazil 
would only be insisting on its right, if it were to look on the 
Treaty of Alliance as of no effect through the omission of that 
clause. It is expedient to insert that statement: — 

"Your Excellency is then right in saying, by your Note of 
" March 23rd, that that which was an obligation, as far as the Allies 
"were concerned, could not constitute a right for the Argentine 
u Government, and the latter would in no wise have been 
" astonished, had the Brazilian Government on that ground 
" declared the Treaty of the 1st May null and void." 



71 



The Argentine Government would not be astonished that 
the Alliance should break up on account of that clause, and yet 
expresses astonishment that Brazil, without breaking the alliance, 
or infringing any right of the Argentine Republic, on finding 
all its endeavours in favour of a negociation in common frustrated 
during two years, should treat with Paraguay separately. The 
contrast between the two solutions will not escape the thoughtful 
appreciation of the Argentine Government itself. 

Continuing upon this point, the Argentine Note adds : 

" You are not right, however, when you say that the fault 
** is attributable solely to the Argentine Republic, inasmuch as 
" in its opposition it was seconded by the Oriental Republic." 

It is noteworthy that in the documents of the Argentine 
Government it is sought to represent Brazil as adopting an 
opinion different from both its Allies. The fact is that the 
Oriental Plenipotentiary was found always in accordance with 
the Brazilian," and there never was between them any great 
divergence — either as regards the preliminary or the definitive 
Convention of Peace. This is shown forth by the very acts of 
these negociations, notwithstanding their brevity and necessary 
reservations. 

The Oriental Plenipotentiary opined that the clause would 
not be found effectual for the settlement of peace with Paraguay ; 
he also enlarged on the question of its expediency, but ac- 
knowledged that his Government had accepted the clause, and 
deemed itself bound to carry it into effect. The Argentine 
Plenipotentiary, in the name of his Government, declined to 
carry it out. Here lies the difference, and to cut short all dis- 
cussion in respect thereof, it is expedient to quote textually the 
words of the Oriental Plenipotentiary in Protocol No. 7 of the 
Buenos Ayres Conferences : — 

" The Oriental Plenipotentiary declared, on the part of the 
" Oriental Republic of Uruguay, that the Act of Alliance, in all 
u its stipulations, had been approved by the competent legislative 
" Powers, just as had been the other acts, which the exceptional 
" position of his country obliged General Flores, in his capacity as 
" Provisional Governor, to adopt, in the absence of a General 
" Assembly." 

In the Conferences at Assuncion, in the presence of the 
ideas expressed by the Argentine Plenipotentiary, the same 
Senator, Dr Adolfo Rodrigues, representing the Oriental State, 
adhered rather to the opinion of the representative of Brazil. 
This is shown by Protocol No. 2 of said Conferences : — 
" The Oriental Plenipotentiary declared on his part that he 
" would assent to that which his colleagues might agree to, but 
" deemed it expedient to observe that he pronounced for the 
" insertion of the clause of the Protocol annexed to the Treaty 
" of Alliance not only because of its being obligatory on his 



72 



" own Government, but because he desired to see adopted the 
" principle contrary to that contended for by his worthy col- 
" league, the representative of the Argentine Republic. The 
" example of Martin Garcia himself gave greater force to his 
" convictions." 

The Argentine Note next observes upon the question of the 
clause of the annexed Protocol : — 

" Facts subsequently showed that the great obstacle to 
" the joint negociation was not the same as in respect to the 
' ' separate negociation. A curious circumstance, which leads 
" to the inference that the true reason, for not declaring at that 
" time and on that ground, the Treaty of Alliance of no effect, 
" was to be found in the odiousness of the clause; the attitude 
" of the Argentine Congress, as far as Brazil was concerned, 
" thus remaining indirectly justified." 

It is the Argentine Government itself which says, and 
repeats, that the Treaty of Alliance became of no effect, or ceased 
to be obligatory for Brazil and the Oriental State, as soon as one of 
the high contracting parties had refused to carry out the clause of 
the annexed Protocol. One does not understand therefore why 
the Argentine Government, while declaring itself a violator of the 
Treaty, in respect to that clause which the other Allies considered 
completely accepted by them, turns round on its Ally merely for 
having treated with Paraguay separately, after that and other 
circumstances had occurred. 

The amicable intention manifested by the Imperial Govern- 
ment not to regard the Treaty meanwhile as of no effect, is placed 
in doubt, and instead of the true motive, there is substituted that 
of a panic fear on account of the odiousness so perseveringly 
insisted on of a clause agreed upon by the Allies. 

The truth, however, comes forth in all its brightness from 
the documents signed by the Allies. Protocol No. 7 states that 
the Brazilian Plenipotentiary, while defending the clause, and 
protesting against its being received by the Argentine Govern- 
ment, proposed that the question should stand over to be decided 
later on, consentaneously with that of the Limits. The terms of 
that proposition, which was adopted, are 

" That further the Argentine Plenipotentiary, having pro- 
" posed, in the most amicable intention, that the question of 
" Limits should be held over, in order to its decision during the 
" negociations with the Paraguayan Government, the Brazilian 
" Plenipotentiary, after making the declarations just expressed, 
" would adopt the same prudent course, proposing in like 
11 manner to his eminent colleagues, that they should reserve 
" the stipulation of the annexed Protocol, to be considered anew, 
" and decided with that of the Limits. That, meanwhile, know- 
" ing well the disposition of the other parties interested in the 
(t one question, as well as the other, it was to be hoped that a 



73 



" means of solving these difficulties in some Timicable way, just 
" and honourable alike to all, might be happened upon." 

The Imperial Government has endeavoured earnestly to act in 
harmony with its Allies, and to conciliate all rights and interests ; 
it had not declared the Treaty of no effect, in the hope that the 
difficulties would at last be satisfactorily solved. 

During the discussion the Brazilian Plenipotentiary ex- 
pressed himself to the effect that, if the Argentine Plenipotentiary 
would declare that, under no state of things, could he accept the 
clause of the annexed Protocol, he, the Brazilian Plenipotentiary, 
had instructions to carry it into effect, on the ground of that 
declaration. The answer of his Excellency was that a supposed 
state of things might arise in which the clause might be accept- 
able, and instanced, by way of example, that of its not meeting 
with any opposition on the part of the Paraguayan Government. 

But, observes the Argentine Note, Brazil surrendered that 
clause in its separate negociation. The explanation lies 
evidently in the difference of the circumstances and in the 
precedents recorded, from which it may be seen that Brazil 
would have yielded likewise in the joint negociation, if this were 
deemed necessary to facilitate the Convention in common, or might 
be done suitably and with decorum. 

The Imperial Government understood that the clause men- 
tioned was to be accompanied by the neutrality of Paraguay, and 
by other guarantees which could only be given by the Allies 
collectively to that Republic. Brazil having been obliged to 
treat separately, these conditions disappeared, and it did not ill 
beseem the dignity of the Empire to grant to the vanquished 
that which had been intended to be imposed as a requirement of 
one of the Allies, despite the obligation contracted by all, and this 
when the Argentine Government, on its own side, was unwilling to 
cede anything in behalf of the common Convention with 
Paraguay. 

The Argentine Note, while considering as illegitimate or 
ominous in its tendency the confidence with which Brazil has 
been able to inspire the vanquished, and which has facilitated its 
settlement of peace, has mentioned facts that call for an explana- 
tion, and goes even to the length of saying that the Imperial 
Government paid subsidies to newspapers favourable to it, which 
is a statement highly improper, considering the wide-bearing of 
the subject that engages the attention of the two Governments. 

" I find it needful here to mention likewise, that a like 
" disproportion exists as well in the occupying army as in the 
" amount of influence brought to bear. While the Republic left 
" in Assuncion no more than a single detachment under its flag, 
" Brazil left an army and a squadron ; wmile the Republic sent 
£< Envoys only when obliged to, to comply with its duty as an 
" Ally, Brazil caused its principal statesmen to take up their 

* x 



74 



" residence in Assuncion, and granted a subvention to newspapers 
" that were favourably inclined. The faculty, then, of occupying 
" and influencing as exercised by the Republic, in conjunction 
V with the Empire, cannot be put in comparison during the whole 
" of that time. The real occupation and the effective influence 
<£ were all on the side of Brazil, who disregarded even the invita- 
" tion addressed by the Republic, tending to a total withdrawal 
" from Paraguay, even before the definitive Treaties were con- 
" eluded." 

It is surprising that Brazil should be accused of having 
acquired, it may be, in the minds of the Government and people 
of Paraguay a legitimate influence, which could only result from 
the good faith shown in its dealings, from its disinterestedness, 
and from the moral and material help it has afforded that people, to 
the end that it may re- constitute itself as a sovereign and inde- 
pendent nation. 

The disproportion between the Brazilian and Argentine 
forces in Paraguay do not date from the Peace. The Allied 
armies had not yet gone further than Humaita, when already 
that of the Republic was partly withdrawn, in order to uphold 
internal order at home. 

In the last phase of the war Brazil had never less than 
twenty thousand men in Paraguay, in addition to its squadron, 
whereas the Argentine forces did not exceed five thousand, and 
took no part in the pursuit of the enemy through the wilds of 
Curugzaty, Iguatemy, and Aquidaban, where the latter received 
its mortal blow. 

If the Imperial Government never uttered a complaint about 
that inequality of sacrifices, but has rather sought to show by acts 
that it would spare no effort to secure the triumph of the Alliance, 
why is it to-day regarded in such an unfavourable light by its 
Ally ? Ought the Empire to have withdrawn its troops with all 
haste, while its rights were unrecognised by Paraguay ? 

The Argentine Government, undoubted^, withdrew almost all 
the remainder of its forces from Paraguay, but did not withdraw 
them in the interest of the liberty of Paraguay, which they would 
have known how to respect, but for its own convenience merely. 
While thus acting, the Argentine Government left there the forces 
which it deemed sufficient to ensure control over Villa Occidental, 
and in like manner to make secure, later on, its sway over the 
territory of the Missiones. 

Brazil could not meanwhile follow the example of its Ally, 
because its circumstances were not identical, nor did it exercise 
over Paraguay an influence like that which the Argentine Govern- 
ment was able to do from those regions, from Corrientes and 
Buenos Ayres. 

With so many natural affinities for the Paraguayan people, 
and from such near proximity, the Argentine Republic was in a 



75 



condition more favourable for gaining that influence it attributes 
to Brazil, but which the latter would not use to the detriment of 
its Ally, nor for ambitious ends which it never harboured, whereof 
unequivocal proof is to be found from its behaviour anteriorly and 
subsequently to the war. 

To the capital of Paraguay the Argentine Government sent 
an illustrious representative, in order to assist at the installation 
of the Provisional Government and to treat with it. Afterwards 
it sent its Minister of Foreign Kelations for the preliminary 
Convention of Peace, and always kept there, in the double capacity 
of military and diplomatic representative, a distinguished General. 
If one of its statesmen did not afford to remain in Paraguay 
during the latter part of the war, or if the Argentine Government 
did not deem it necessary, the fault does not lie with Brazil. 
The Imperial Government kept there during that time an Envoy 
of high standing, because it concerned it greatly to avoid all 
political complications that might retard the conclusion of the 
war, the burden of which weighed almost exclusively on the 
Empire, and further, because it attached great importance to its 
own pacific and amicable Conventions with the Provisional 
Government. 

To the end that this discussion may not become more 
irksome, no answer is given to the rash allegation /about news- 
papers having been subsidised by Brazil. Suffice it on this 
point to observe that the Argentine press was but a short 
distance from Assuncion, and never ceased from praising up the 
influence of its own nationality. In the very capital of Paraguay 
a paper was published, edited, as is well known, by a military 
functionary of the Argentine Legion. 

The Imperial Government has never thought of attaching 
importance to the unjust appreciations which sometimes appeared 
in the papers against Brazilian policy, and still less could it place 
them on a level with the responsibility attaching to its Ally. 

MANUEL FRANCISCO CORREIA. 

Bio de Janeiro, 20th June, 1872. 



No. 4. 



NOTE OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO THE 
IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE 
WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM THE ISLAND 
OF ATAJO. 

Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic, 
Buenos Ayres, 27th of April, 1872. 

Your Excellency, — 

I received, on the 5th inst., a Note dated the 21st of 
March, acknowledging that transmitted by this Department on 
the 31st of January last concerning the island of Atajo. 

Your Excellency therein endeavours to show that the 
Imperial Government, in occupying the island, had not the 
slightest idea of gaining territory from the enemy, nor even of 
raising its claims in regard to Limits beyond what it had during 
peace proposed to Paraguay. 

That, consistently with this proposition, neither during the 
war nor when victory was declared did the Imperial Govern- 
ment employ any act contrary to that solemn declaration, trust- 
ing consequently that its Ally would not attribute to it even the 
remotest thought of acquiring the island of Atajo to subject it 
to the sway of the Empire. 

That, by the occupation, which had as its originating 
motive the greater advantage of the Allied forces, it had not 
pretended to establish any kind of dominion, and that it will 
cease as soon as possible, since the interest itself of Brazil re- 
quires this. 

The island having, in effect, been occupied in the interest 
of the Alliance during the war with Paraguay, the Argentine 
Government never looked upon this fact otherwise than as a 
military measure permissible to the Brazilian and Argentine 
Generals, in their respective territories. 

The occupation of the island, at the mouth of the river 
Paraguay, facing at its upper extremity the enemy's territory, 
and commanding the middle of the navigable channel, was a 



77 



strategic position which the Alliance neither could, nor ought to 
despise before carrying Humaita, and even afterwards, as a base 
of operations which brought them near to Assuncion. 

But this occupation continuing two years after the conclu- 
sion of the war is a strange fact, for which the explanations 
offered neither are nor can be deemed satisfactory, and the Im- 
perial Government itself so views it, since it does not now, in order 
to continue it, allege the necessities of war, but only the heavy 
material it has there, and which has to be transported a great 
distance ; and the inexpediency of the withdrawal precisely at 
the time when the Imperial Government is looking for the 
execution of the terms but lately signed at Assuncion. 

Inasmuch as the island was occupied solely with a view to 
the war, on the latter being brought to a close, the withdrawal 
of troops might commence, and however heavy the material 
transported thither, the two years that have elapsed from thence 
until now should more than suffice to remove it. The execu- 
tion of the terms lately signed at Assuncion does not appear a 
sufficient reason to continue the occupation, seeing that the 
island belongs to the Argentine Republic, and it is not from 
its Ally, who knows how to defend it against Paraguay, that 
Brazil need fear any obstacles to free navigation. Moreover the 
occupation of the island, and still more the presence of three 
thousand men in Humaita and Assuncion, would be an excess 
of guarantees for the carrying out of the terms, which could 
not readily be acceded to. 

Brazil, possessing naval officers, who, on account of the war, 
have been navigating and studying the rivers Parana and Para- 
guay, the Argentine Government is unable to comprehend the 
portion of the Note to which it is replying to in respect to the 
position of the island, unless it arise from carelessness in con- 
sulting them. The island is situated on the territory of the 
Chaco, to the right of Bermejo, which never was the cause of 
any dispute to the Republic, neither on the part of Bolivia nor Para- 
guay. The island happens to be divided from that territory, but by 
a little river now almost dried up. Up to the year 1844 the 
Correntinos kept there, as well as on the adjacent land of the 
Chaco, considerable stations, which in that year the Paraguayans 
violently destroyed, occupying, in like manner by violence, part 
of the territory of the Missiones. 

The island of Atajo is placed then in the same case as that 
territory, and the Argentine Government being bound to exercise 
over it the dominion and vigilance necessary for the advantage 
of its revenues, expects that the Imperial Government, after 
weighing these fresh considerations with friendly judgment, will 
seek to shorten the time of the promised withdrawal without 
prejudging or assuming any responsibility in regard to the ques- 
tion of jurisdiction. 



78 



The undersigned might have added other considerations as 
to the efficacy of the measures adopted by the Brazilian officers,, 
without the consent or previous understanding with the Argen- 
tine Government, for the purpose of stopping smuggling, the 
faithful carrying out of which measures was recently urged ; he 
deems that they would be unnecessary, inasmuch as, notwith- 
standing these inconveniences, the Imperial Government requires 
some time still for the withdrawal of the troops. He limits 
himself to requesting that, meanwhile, a knowledge of these 
measures may be communicated to him, so that, on his side, 
they may be made effectual, and thus render the temporary 
occupation less prejudicial. 

I pray, your Excellency, to accept on this occasion the ex- 
pression of my highest esteem and consideration. 

C. TEJEDOR. 

To His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Empire of Brazil. 



No. 5. 



NOTE OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT TO THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 

Rio de Janeiro, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
21st of June, 1872. 

The undersigned, of the Council of His Majesty the 
Emperor of Brazil, Minister and Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, received on the 18th ultimo the Note which, 
under date of 27th of April last, was addressed to him by His 
Excellency Senhor D. Carlos Tejedor, Minister of Foreign 
Relations of the Argentine Republic, acknowledging that of the 
undersigned of 22nd of March, respecting the maintenance in 
the island of Atajo of a Brazilian arsenal, with the forces 
necessary to garrison it, and for military service. , 

Your Excellency says that the occupation of this island, 
situated at the mouth of the river Paraguay, the upper ex- 
tremity of which fronts the enemy's territory controlling the 
only navigable channel, was a strategical position which the 
Alliance neither could nor ought to despise before carrying 
Humaita, and even afterwards, as a base of operations ; but that 
tliis occupation should continue two years after the conclusion of 
the war is a strange fact, for which the explanations offered neither 
are nor can be satisfactory. 

While insisting that the island belongs to that Republic, 
from the fact of its being in the territory of the Chaco, below 
the river Bermejo, which never gave rise to any dispute, either 
on the part of Bolivia, or of Paraguay, your Excellency 
acknowledges that the Imperial Government requires some time 
for the withdrawal of troops, limiting your request to this that it 
should be done with the least delay possible, knowledge of the 
measures taken for preventing any attempt at smuggling within 
the territory of the island being meanwhile furnished, in order that 
the Argentine Government, on its side, may make them effectual 
and thus render the temporary occupation less prejudicial. 

Referring to what the undersigned has said about the 
position of the Island of Atajo, your Excellency observes that 



80 



you cannot explain those propositions except from carelessness 
on the part of the Imperial Government in omitting to consult 
the able naval officers that Brazil has stationed there. 

The position of the said island was not unknown anteriorly 
to the war with Paraguay, and, therefore, the Imperial Govern- 
ment did not require to ponder over the knowledge acquired 
during its occupation, in order to assert, as it has done, that the 
middle line of the river does not separate it from the Chaco 
side, nor in order to know that it now approaches the right bank, 
and now the left, as well as that there exists on the Chaco side 
a navigable channel, although not actually so deep as the other 
which is used for the general traffic. Your Excellency yourself 
confirms the fact that the upper part of the island, the only one 
that is inhabitable, forms a frontier to the Paraguayan territory. 

But leaving aside this question of fact,, which interests more 
especially the Argentine Republic and that of Paraguay, it will 
suffice for the undersigned to indicate two points in which the 
Note of Senhor Tejedor fully justifies the act of the Imperial 
Government : — 

" 1st. That the occupation of the island was a strategical 
" position, which the Alliance ought not to despise. 

" 2nd. That some time is still necessary for the withdrawal 
<4 of the troops." 

Thus, then, the course followed by Brazil during the war 
and after victory, as regards the time indispensable for the 
removal of the heavy war material actually on the island finds 
itself explained even by the Note itself of Senhor Tejedor. 

On his side the undersigned will add that the occupation, 
which was necessary during the war, is even so no^v, as a conse- 
quence of the position in which the Allies find themselves after 
their victory which had not then been at once sealed by defi- 
nitive settlements of Peace. 

Your Excellency, not disputing the fact that the Brazilian 
Generals occupied the island under the persuasion that they 
were turning to account an enemy's territory, a statement fully 
borne out by the Note of the 22nd of March ; and not denying 
the other direct proposition contained in it to the effect that, 
this island had been in the possession of the Paraguayans, who 
kept a military post there, you must needs acknowledge that 
before the settlement of Limits between that Republic and Para- 
guay, it cannot be said that Brazil ought to withdraw its troops 
immediately from that point on the ground of its being Argen- 
tine territory. 

This occupation is not, as your Excellency thinks, an excess 
of guarantees, the Imperial Government having to watch over 
the execution of the settlements signed at Assuncion at the 
beginning of this year. The Argentine Government will per- 
fectly understand that the Brazilian could not rest satisBed with 



81 



a mere signature of the Treaties of Peace, and still less deem 
itself secure with such a guarantee, without being able to reckon 
on the moral support to be derived from the perfect agreement 
between the Allies, even though from this circumstance there 
might result a further weakening of the Paraguayan Government 
which had to cany out the settlements aforesaid on the part of 
the Republic. 

The provisions and precautions of the Imperial Govern- 
ment can still be less contested by the Argentine Republic, after 
the judgment which the latter has given expression to in another 
Note of the 27th of April, in respect to certain of the stipula- 
tions of those Treaties relating to the ancient claim and pre- 
tensions of the Paraguayans. 

The occupation did not take place in order that the settle- 
ments referred to should be concluded. It is a fact antecedent, 
and as it might continue, in the event of the negociations 
entered upon in the capital of Paraguay being suspended, or 
their being carried out to a successful issue, there was no positive 
motive for acting otherwise ; the occasion for adopting a different 
course beforehand would have been inopportune. 

The Imperial Government, being always disposed, as far as 
possible, to fall in with the desires of the Argentine Government, 
the undersigned does not hesitate in making known to Senhor 
Tejedor the measures taken to suppress the supposed abuse in 
the matter of smuggling in the island of Atajo. It has forbidden 
the discharge at the island of vessels not duly cleared for that 
destination by the proper authorities of the Empire, of Paraguay 
or of any one of the States of the Plate. 

At the same time the undersigned must insist, however, 
on the statement he made previously, namely, that the Imperial 
Government has no knowledge of any act of smuggling practised 
in the island mentioned. On making inquiries about the 
complaint of the Argentine Government, the Commandant of the 
Brazilian garrison of Cerrito declares as follows : — 

u During the period of nearly thirty months, since I am in 
" the administration of this naval station, there is no evidence that 
" any smuggling has taken place here of any kind whatever, or 
" from any quarter, and I call on the Argentine authorities to 
" produce facts or documentary proofs." 

In undertaking to reply to all the points in the Note of your 
Excellency, which might call for an explanation, I have done so 
for the purpose of showing that the Imperial Government 
attaches importance to the publicity of its acts in the assur- 
ance that it is showing the strict desire with which it has sought 
to respect the principles of justice and the engagements it 
contracts. 

Your Excellency, being now convinced that the Imperial 
Government does not harbour the remotest idea of conquest or 



82 



sway over the island of Atajo, and acknowledging that some 
time is necessary to bring to an end the occupation which was 
determined on during the war, and is still kept up for motives 
that have been explained, the undersigned avails himself of this 
opportunity to renew to his Excellency the Minister of Foreign 
Relations the assurance of his highest consideration. 

MANOEL FRANCISCO CORREIA. 

To His Excellency Senlwr Carlos Tejedor, Minister of 
Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic. 



BARON DE COTEGIPE ON THE ARGENTINE NOTE. 



[From the Anglo-Brazilian Times of July 2Wi, 1872.] 

BARON DE COTEGIPE, the negociator of the Treaties 
with Paraguay, which so greatly excited the ires of 
Senhor Tejedor and induced his inflammatory Note of the 
27th of April, has published in Bahia a reply to several of the 
assertions and insinuations of that Note. 

Having been written before knowing the reply of the 
Imperial Government, Baron de Cotegipe's letter touches 
mainly on points already fairly elucidated in the Government's 
Note of June 20th ; but fresh light is thrown upon various 
incidents of importance, and the desire, nay, anxiety of the 
Brazilian Government to conciliate the Argentine Government, 
and to avoid resort to the foreseen but unwelcome expedient 
of separate negociation, is rendered very salient by the Brazilian 
negociator's revelations. 

Thus, when, on the 30th of November, 1871, the Argen- 
tine Envoy formally demanded, as preliminary to any negocia- 
tion with the Paraguayan Plenipotentiaries, the Allies' accept- 
ance of the Argentine exigence in regard to the Chaco Limits, 
namely, that the Allies were bound to enforce the Argentine 
judgment on the Argentine titles to the Chaco, Baron de 
Cotegipe, while refusing, in accord with the Oriental Envoy, 
to engage previously to enforce a judgment in which they 
were not to be allowed to take part, declared : — 

" 1st. That the Brazilian Government had never ceased to 
" recognise and sustain the Treaty of the 1st of May, 1865, as 
" obligatory on the Allies in all its stipulations. 

" 2nd. That it is not, and never was, its intention to 
" involve itself in the question of the Argentine Limits, 
<l further than to give it all the support compatible with 
" that Treaty and the ideas already set forth in the present 
" Conference. 

" 3rd. That no refusal was made to examine, at a fitting 
" time and in common with the other Allies, the means adequate 
" to overcome the supposed reluctance of Paraguay, in accord 
" with the letter and spirit of Article XVII. of the Treaty of 
" Alliance." 

One of the greatest dreads of Baron de Cotegipe was that 
the Paraguayan Government might, out of fear of Paraguayan 
public opinion, resign, and thus throw the nation on the hands 
of the Allies ; and he, therefore, made the greatest efforts to 



84 



induce Dr Quintana not to leave Assuneion and stop conjunct 
negotiations, which course, he warned the Argentine negotiator, 
on the 30th of November, would infallibly cause Brazil to make 
its Treaties separately. Baron de Cotegipe even expressly 
declared to Dr Quintana, when this Envoy announced his 
intent to stop the negotiations and to leave Assuneion, that if 
the Argentine Government would content itself with the 
Missiones and with the Pilcomayo line of the Chaco, Brazil 
would, on its part, draw back its frontier, and would not only 
not make separate Treaties with Paraguay, but would even 
make common cause with the Confederation, thus removing 
the divergence between them. Dr Quintana, however, declined, 
on pretence that Paraguay would not accept and was acting 
with bad faith. Thus it is seen the Brazilian negociator 
exhausted every honourable means of conciliation before pro- 
ceeding to the separate negotiation. 

Baron de Cotegipe also shows that, at the interview at 
Buenos Ay res, he declared explicitly to Senhor Tejedor that, 
if the conciliatory plan then proposed by the latter had for its 
basis the non-ratification of the Treaties made at Assuneion, 
the Brazilian Government would not accept it ; whereon 
Senhor Tejedor replied that he counted on the ratification of 
the Treaties, and that, therefore, any plan proposed would not 
prejudice them. 

Baron de Cotegipe's letter is full of similar instances by 
which the inaccuracies, if not the false faith, of Senhor 
Tejedor's Note are revealed, and the moderation and concilia- 
tory spirit of the Brazilian Government are displayed in 
higher relief. 




PRINTED BY C. "VV. REYNELL, LITTLE PULTENEY STREET, EAYMARKET, W. 



CORRESPONDENCE 

BETWEEN 

THE BRAZILIAN AND ARGENTINE 
GOVERNMENTS 

RESPECTING 

THE TREATIES CONCLUDED BETWEEN BRAZIL AND 
THE REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY AND THE 
WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM THE ISLAND OF 

AT A JO. 



■ - 

LONDON: 

PRINTED BY C. W. REYNELL, LITTLE PULTENEY STREET, 

HATMARKET. 

i 



August, 1872. 



